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Chapter 1
Introduction
This dissertation analyzes the impact of shocks to uncertainty on the macroeconomy and on
the housing sector. To this end, I examine different approaches to measuring and modeling
uncertainty. My work contributes to this growing literature as follows. Chapter two clarifies
one possible source of confusion in the calibration of models using uncertainty shocks, that
between ex-ante vs. ex-post uncertainty measures. Chapter three proposes a different approach
to modeling uncertainty shocks, that corresponds to the empirical evidence of Jurado, Ludvigson
and Ng (2015) and Ludvigson, Ma, and Ng (2016). Chapter four investigates how the factors of
production uncertainty, financial intermediation, and credit constrained households can affect
housing prices and aggregate economic activity.
Uncertainty as a factor influencing or governing decisions of economic agents has experienced
increasing attention in recent years. Early work, such as Bernanke (1983) and McDonald and
Siegel (1986), assumes irreversibility of investments to generate real options effects. More recent
work, such as Dorofeenko, Lee, and Salyer (2008, 2014) or Christiano, Motto and Rostagno
(2014), focuses on the impact of uncertainty in the context of financial frictions in Dynamic
Stochastic General Equilibrium models. In these models, productivity’s time-varying second
moment is part of the policy function despite first order approximation and impacts an economy
via the optimal contract between borrowers and lenders. The literature on uncertainty and
macroeconomics is divided, however, on the (magnitude of the) effects and the propagation
mechanism of uncertainty on aggregate fluctuations. Dorofeenko et al. (2008), for instance,
examine a 1% unexpected jump in uncertainty and find a large impact on the credit channel
but little impact on real variables. Dorofeenko et al. (2014), which combines the model of
Dorofeenko et al. (2008) with the multi-sector model of Davis and Heathcote (2005) to examine
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the impact of risk on the housing market, show that uncertainty matters for the housing market
and especially for housing prices - but not so much for real variables. Christiano et al. (2014),
in contrast, add a news component to uncertainty shocks and report that risk shocks are the
most important source of business cycle fluctuations. As virtually all the work is done by the
exogenous definition of the exogenous risk shocks, as shown by Lee, Salyer and Strobel (2016), it
is crucially important to properly model and calibrate uncertainty. To this end, various proxies
have been proposed in the literature.
Chapter two1, On Measuring Uncertainty Shocks, empirically shows systematic differences in
those proxies, as realized variables fluctuate more than the measures that are based on forecasts.
More precisely, the variation in the realized cross-sectional standard deviation of profit growth
and stock returns is larger than the variation in the forecast standard deviation.
Chapter three2, Hump-shape Uncertainty, Agency Costs and Aggregate Fluctuations, intro-
duces a different approach to modeling uncertainty shocks. The uncertainty measures due to
Jurado, Ludvigson and Ng (2015) and Ludvigson, Ma, and Ng (2016) show a hump-shape time
path: Uncertainty rises for two years before its decline. Current literature on the effects of
uncertainty on macroeconomics, including housing, has not accounted for this observation. This
chapter shows that when uncertainty rises and falls over time, then the output displays hump-
shape with short expansions that are followed by longer and persistent contractions. And because
of these longer and persistent contractions in output, uncertainty is, on average, counter-cyclical.
The model builds on the literature combining uncertainty and financial constraints. We model
the time path of uncertainty shocks to match empirical evidence in terms of shape, duration
and magnitude. In the calibrated models, agents anticipate this hump-shape uncertainty time
path once a shock has occurred. Thereby, agents respond immediately by increasing invest-
ment (i.e. pre-cautionary savings), but face a substantial drop in investment, consumption and
output as more uncertain times lie ahead. With persistent uncertain periods, both risk premia
and bankruptcies increase, which cause a further deterioration in investment opportunities. Be-
sides, accounting for hump-shape uncertainty measures can result in a large quantitative effect
of uncertainty shock relative to previous literature.
Chapter four3, Housing and Macroeconomy: The Role of Credit Channel, Risk -, Demand -
and Monetary Shocks, uses the standard approach to modeling risk shock to demonstrate that
risk (uncertainty) along with the monetary (interest rates) shocks to the housing production
1This chapter has been published under the title On the different approaches of measuring uncertainty shocks
in 2015 in Economics Letters, 134, 69-72.
2This chapter is joint work with Gabriel Lee and Kevin Salyer.
3This chapter is joint work with Victor Dorofeenko, Gabriel Lee and Kevin Salyer.
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sector are a quantitatively important impulse mechanism for the business and housing cycles.
Our model framework is that of the housing supply/banking sector model as developed in Do-
rofeenko, Lee, and Salyer (2014) with the model of housing demand presented in Iacoviello and
Neri (2010). We examine how the factors of production uncertainty, financial intermediation,
and credit constrained households can affect housing prices and aggregate economic activity.
Moreover, this analysis is cast within a monetary framework which permits a study of how
monetary policy can be used to mitigate the deleterious effects of cyclical phenomenon that
originates in the housing sector. We provide empirical evidence that large housing price and
residential investment boom and bust cycles in Europe and the U.S. over the last few years are
driven largely by economic fundamentals and financial constraints. We also find that, quanti-
tatively, the impact of risk and monetary shocks are almost as great as that from technology
shocks on some of the aggregate real variables. This comparison carries over to housing market
variables such as the price of housing, the risk premium on loans, and the bankruptcy rate of
housing producers.
3
Chapter 2
On Measuring Uncertainty Shocks
This chapter has been published under the title On the different approaches of measuring un-
certainty shocks in 2015 in Economics Letters, 134, 69-72.
2.1 Introduction
Uncertainty has become increasingly prominent as a source of business cycle fluctuations. Since
there is no objective measure of uncertainty, various uncertainty proxies have been proposed
in the literature, with “uncertainty” often formalized as time-varying second moment.1 Bloom,
Floetotto, Jaimovich, Saporta-Eksten, and Terry (2012), for instance, use uncertainty proxies
derived from both realized and forecast real variables to calibrate their model, while Bloom
(2009) uses a measure of forecast stock market volatility. Chugh (2013) and Dorofeenko et al.
(2014), in turn, derive uncertainty on a sectoral level based on realized real data.
This paper shows that ex ante, the standard deviation of profit growth and stock returns
in the U.S. economy, in the manufacturing sector and in the services sector fluctuates less than
ex post by comparing the conditional standard deviation forecast to the realized cross-sectional
standard deviation and to the interquartile range (IQR). This finding corroborates the argument
of Leahy and Whited (1996, p. 68), that “since uncertainty relates to expectations and not to
actual outcomes, it would be incorrect to use the ex post volatility of asset returns as a measure
of the variability of the firm’s environment. We therefore need an ex ante measure”. Moreover,
my results also show that the forecast standard deviation of profit growth and stock returns are
negatively or at times uncorrelated.
1A comprehensive survey of the literature can be found in Bloom (2014).
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I use a Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity-in-mean (GARCH-M)
model to forecast the conditional standard deviation of profit growth and stock returns in the
manufacturing sector, the services sector and the U.S. economy. The results of the GARCH-M
estimation also show that a higher conditional standard deviation increases stock returns due
to a higher risk premium and decreases average profit growth.
2.2 Data
For the following analysis, two data sets used in Bloom (2009) are considered.2 The first data
set contains observations on pre-tax profits, sales and industry for a total of 347 firms, 242 of
which are in manufacturing and 23 are in the services sector in the United States from 1964Q4
to 2005Q1. The growth rate of quarterly profits ∆Πt, normalized by sales St, is calculated as
∆Π˜t =
Πt−Πt−4
1/2(St+St−4) .
3 The second data set contains information on firm-level stock returns for
firms in the United States included in the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) stock-
returns file with 500 or more monthly observations.4 The analysis focuses on the manufacturing
sector, the services sector and the whole economy. In the absence of selection bias, mean,
and standard deviation can be interpreted as return and risk per month from investing in a
representative firm in of the sectors or the economy.5 As the data are constructed to reflect an
average firm’s mean and standard deviation of stock returns and profit growth, the conditional
variance reflects uncertainty and innovations to the conditional variance mirror uncertainty
shocks in a sector. Using a GARCH-M model, I can predict the conditional standard deviation
of stock returns and profit growth of an average firm, test whether uncertainty shocks have an
effect on profit growth or stock returns and compare them to the realized cross-sectional standard
deviation. Due to its theoretical correspondence, the conditional variance of productivity growth
complements the uncertainty proxies.6
The mean equation of the GARCH-M model is formulated as xt = µ + θσ
2
t + ut, ut|It−1 ∼
N(0, σ2t ), while the conditional variance σ
2
t is assumed to follow a GARCH(1,1) process with
one-step-ahead predictions given by σ2t+1|t = ω+αu
2
t +βσ
2
t Engle, Lilien, and Robins (1987). xt
corresponds to stock returns, profit growth or TFP growth, µ is the mean, σ2t is the conditional
2A detailed description is included in the Appendix.
3Profit growth is calculated year-on-year to account for seasonality.
4More precisely, it contains data on 361 firms, 208 of which are in manufacturing and 10 are in the services
sector, ranging from 1962M8 to 2006M12.
5Selection bias might be an issue, as only firms with 500 or more monthly data are included in the analysis.
However, the bias is downward, potentially understating the impact of uncertainty.
6Quarterly data on TFP growth from Basu, Fernald, and Kimball (2006) from 1950Q1 to 2013Q4.
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variance and ut is an uncorrelated but serially dependent error. Normality of ut is a starting
point and will be tested for. The one-period forecast of σ2t , based on TFP growth data is this
paper’s Benchmark uncertainty estimation. The usefulness of σt+1|t as benchmark is due to
four reasons. First, uncertainty shocks are identified as innovations to the conditional one period
forecast of the variance. Second, heteroskedasticity is modeled conditional on past information.
Third, the GARCH-M approach allows for the conditional variance to affect profit growth, stock
returns or TFP and fourth, out of sample forecasts can be done easily.7
2.3 Results
Table 2.1 reports the distribution of ut and parameter estimation results. The effect of the condi-
tional variance on profit growth or stock return depends on the sector. A hypothetical increase of
Profit growth Stock returns TFP Growth
Manufacturing Services Economy Manufacturing Services Economy
Distribution t(8.93) Normal Normal Normal Normal Normal Normal
µ .017*** .014*** .013*** .004 .004 .003 .006
θ -16.48*** -.906 -10.156 4.491 3.026* 5.806 6.053
α .470*** .389** .411** 0.788*** .070** .079** .065
β .477*** -.599*** .405 .880*** .907*** .872*** .883***
ω .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Table 2.1: Parameter estimates of the GARCH-M model based on mean profit growth (1964Q4
- 2005Q1), mean stock return (1962M8 - 2006M12) and TFP growth (1950Q1 - 2013Q4) in
the manufacturing sector, in the services sector, in the U.S. economy. The distribution for the
maximum likelihood estimation is chosen based on the Kolmogorov-Smirnoff test. Test results
are reported in table 5 in the Appendix. Asterisks indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
level based on Bollerslev-Wooldridge robust standard errors. Source: Compustat Database,
CRSP, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
50% in the variance across time decreases expected quarterly profit by 29% in the manufacturing
sector and by 8% in the services sector, although only the former result is significant.8
The risk premia of 1.20% in the services sector, 1.03% in the manufacturing sector and 1.07%
in the whole economy seem rather low and might be driven by aggregation and a downward bias,
given a p-value of 9.6% in the services sector, 18.6% in the manufacturing sector and 10.8% in
the U.S. economy.9
Figure 2.1 shows IQR, realized and forecast standard deviation per period, estimated as
7Test results for the presence of ARCH effects using Engle’s Lagrange multiplier (LM) test are reported in the
appendix.
8The change in expected quarterly profit growth in the manufacturing sector is calculated as
[(.0182247+1.5*.0003164 *(-20.9759))/(.0182247+.0003164 *(-20.9759))]-1=-0.2863 and analogously in the ser-
vices sector.
9The risk premium is calculated as e.g. 3.026 ∗ σ¯2t = 1.20% in the services sector.
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Figure 2.1: IQR, standard deviation and uncertainty proxy for the manufacturing sector, the
services sector and the U.S. economy based on normalized profit growth from 1964Q4 to 2005Q1.
Source: Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED), Compustat Database.
explained above using data on profit growth. Forecast fluctuations are lower than the realized
ones in the whole economy, as well as in both sectors. In the manufacturing sector, uncertainty
increases after recessions, while this is not as clear for the IQR and standard deviation. In the
services sector, the fluctuations do not seem to be associated with the occurrence of recessions. A
similar pattern is observable for the IQR and standard deviation.10 Figure 2.2 shows somewhat
similar results for stock returns. As can be seen in Figures 2.1 and 2.2, IQR and realized
standard deviation fluctuate much more than their predicted counterpart which suggests that
realizations of profit growth or stock returns further away from the mean occur more frequently
than expected.
To compare these uncertainty proxies to more prominent ones, table 2 shows the pairwise
correlation coefficients of Macro Uncertainty of Jurado et al. (2015), the V IX used in Bloom
(2009), Policy Uncertainty constructed by Baker, Bloom and Davis (2012), this paper’s forecast-
based proxies including the Benchmark, the cyclical component of HP-filtered real GDP and a
recession indicator. Interestingly, the correlation of the conditional standard deviation forecast
10Table 2.4 displays the summary statistics of the time-series, and it can be seen that, on average, the expected
conditional standard deviation fluctuates less than the realized standard deviation.
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Figure 2.2: IQR, standard deviation and uncertainty proxy for the manufacturing sector, the
services sector and the U.S. economy based on stock returns from 1962M8 to 2006M12. Source:
FRED, CRSP.
for profit growth and stock returns are very low or even negative. Moreover, the correlation
coefficients of the volatility of stock returns and profit growth are quite different from each
other.
Variables PG - M PG - S PG - E SM - M SM - S SM - E Benchmark MacroUnc V IX PolicyUnc GDP Recession
PG - M 1.00
PG - S 0.17 1.00
PG - E 0.87 0.08 1.00
SM - M -0.24 -0.19 -0.05 1.00
SM - S 0.01 0.00 0.09 0.80 1.00
SM - E 0.01 0.00 0.09 0.83 0.98 1.00
Benchmark -0.29 -0.34 -0.18 0.50 0.29 0.32 1.00
MacroUnc -0.04 -0.23 0.03 0.49 0.47 0.47 0.40 1.00
V IX 0.41 0.22 0.36 0.22 0.54 0.53 0.02 0.51 1.00
PolicyUnc 0.28 -0.32 0.35 0.51 0.45 0.44 0.33 0.43 0.41 1.00
GDP -0.30 -0.04 -0.30 -0.20 -0.21 -0.27 -0.30 -0.13 -0.19 -0.34 1.00
Recession 0.13 -0.08 0.14 0.38 0.37 0.41 0.35 0.56 0.41 0.26 -0.41 1.00
Table 2.2: Correlation coefficients of the uncertainty proxies of Jurado et al. (2015), Bloom
(2009), this paper’s forecast proxies, the cyclical component of HP-filtered GDP and a reces-
sion indicator. PG corresponds to the uncertainty proxy based on profit growth, SM to the
uncertainty proxy based on stock market returns; M refers to the manufacturing sector, S to
the services sector and E to the whole economy. Source: Jurado et al. (2015), Bloom (2009),
FRED.
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2.4 Conclusion
This paper presents empirical evidence that ex post, profit growth and stock returns fluctuate
more than ex ante. Moreover, fluctuations differ across sectors and depend on whether financial
or real variables are used to calculate uncertainty. It is important to calibrate theoretical models
accordingly, so as not to overstate the role of uncertainty. Uncertainty shocks decrease profit
growth and increase stock returns. Variation in the forecast standard deviation of profit growth
is not or negatively correlated with the forecast standard deviation in stock returns.
2.5 Appendix
Compustat and CRSP data were downloaded from, http://www.stanford.edu/~nbloom/quarterly2007a
.zip.
Federal Reserve Economic Data
• Real GDP - GDPC1
• NBER Recession Indicator - USREC
Jurado et al.’s Uncertainty Proxy
Downloaded from http://www.econ.nyu.edu/user/ludvigsons/jlndata.zip.
Baker, Bloom and Davis’ Uncertainty Proxy
Downloaded from http://www.policyuncertainty.com/us monthly.html.
Tables
lags(p) Benchmark PG - M PG - S SR - M SR - S PG - E SR - E
1 0.68 0.01 0.00 0.94 0.38 0.00 0.69
2 0.37 0.03 0.02 0.20 0.08 0.00 0.39
3 0.51 0.03 0.02 0.25 0.16 0.00 0.28
4 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.23 0.14 0.00 0.22
5 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.18
6 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.41 0.00 0.00 0.24
Table 2.3: LM test results (p-values) ARCH effects. H0: No ARCH effects. PG refers to profit
growth in the respective sector, SR to stock market returns.
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Variable Period Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Benchmark 1950Q2-2013Q4 255 0.0322011 0.0046514 0.0249326 0.0445141
PG - Uncertainty - M 1965Q1-2005Q1 161 .0165385 .006576 .0098383 .0492981
PG - SD - M 1964Q4-2005Q1 162 0.1218006 0.081629 0.0338525 0.3934643
PG - IQR - M 1964Q4-2005Q1 162 0.0463093 0.0140203 0.027208 0.1056035
PG - Uncertainty- S 1965Q1-2005Q1 161 .0325351 .0123575 .0062582 .0924728
PG - SD - S 1964Q4-2005Q1 162 0.1149527 0.1034904 0.0160815 0.750572
PG - IQR - S 1964Q4-2005Q1 162 0.0534658 0.0229156 0.0144204 0.1328126
PG - Uncertainty - E 1965Q1-2005Q1 161 .016468 .0055934 .0106198 .0460832
PG - SD - E 1964Q4-2005Q1 162 .1422853 .0751701 .0371676 .3778371
PG - IQR -E 1964Q4-2005Q1 162 .044808 .0126902 .0255474 .1030053
SR - Uncertainty - M 1962M9-2006M12 532 .0599957 .0136417 .0376273 .1099285
SR - SD - M 1962M8-2006M12 533 .0794473 .0143971 .0417152 .1368466
SR - IQR - M 1962M8-2006M12 533 .0930246 .0229461 .0293718 .1932621
SR - Uncertainty - S 1962M9-2006M12 532 .0464516 .0083419 .0323597 .0787909
SR - SD - S 1962M8-2006M12 533 .0854849 .0297119 .0232313 .1796676
SR - IQR - S 1962M8-2006M12 533 .1025599 .0479853 .0066667 .3346002
SR - Uncertainty - E 1962M9-2006M12 532 .0421943 .007941 .0297886 .0785901
SR - SD - E 1962M8-2006M15 533 .079327 .0144982 .0553241 .1450797
SR - IQR - E 1962M8-2006M15 533 .0880501 .0219151 .050024 .2045099
Table 2.4: Summary statistics of the Uncertainty Measures. PG corresponds to profit growth
in manufacturing (M), services (S), and the whole economy (E), SR to stock market returns.
Uncertainty measure p-val H0 : Normality Distribution
TFP 0.26 Normal
Profit Growth M 0.00 t(8.93)
Profit Growth S 0.13 Normal
Profit Growth E 0.44 Normal
Stock returns M 0.38 Normal
Stock returns S 0.35 Normal
Stock returns E 0.53 Normal
Table 2.5: Test results - standardized residuals after GARCH-M estimation. Normality tested
using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.
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Chapter 3
Hump-shape Uncertainty, Agency
Costs and Aggregate Fluctuations
3.1 Introduction
This chapter combines uncertainty shocks that rise and fall over time with an agency cost model
to provide a further explanation for the observed cyclical fluctuations in output and consumption
in the U.S. We model uncertainty (i.e. risk) shocks, changes in the standard deviation around
a constant mean, corresponding to the empirical work of Jurado, Ludvigson and Ng (2015)
(Macro Uncertainty) and Ludvigson, Ma and Ng (2016) (Financial Uncertainty): We model
the time path of uncertainty shocks to match empirical evidence in terms of shape, duration
and magnitude. These previously measured uncertainty shocks using the U.S. data show a
hump-shape time path: Uncertainty rises for two years before its decline. Current literature
on the effects uncertainty on macroeconomics, including housing, has not accounted for this
observation. Consequently, the literature on uncertainty and macroeconomics is divided on the
effects and the propagation mechanism of uncertainty on aggregate fluctuations. The models
examining the effects of uncertainty in the presence of financial constraints, such as Dorofeenko,
Lee and Salyer (2008, henceforth DLS), Chugh (2016), Dmitriev and Hoddenbagh (2015) and
Bachmann and Bayer (2013) find uncertainty shock plays quantitatively small role in explaining
aggregate fluctuations. Whereas Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2014), however, find the effect
of uncertainty shock on aggregate variables is quantitatively large.1 A common theme on all of
1Some other works that find a large uncertainty effect are Bloom (2009), Bloom, Alfaro and Lin (2016) and
Bloom, Floetotto, Jaimovich, Saporta-Eksten, and Terry (2012), and Leduc and Liu (2015). There are other
works that find a mixed results such as Gilchrist, Sim, and Zakrajsek (2014), who find a small impact on output
and consumption but a large impact on investment.
11
these aforementioned literature on uncertainty, however, is that a risk shock is characterized by
an immediate one time peak after the innovation (i.e. non-hump shape).
This paper shows that when uncertainty rises and falls over time, then the output displays
hump-shape with short expansions that are followed by longer and persistent contractions. And
because of these longer and persistent contractions in output, uncertainty is, on average, coun-
tercyclical. Our model builds on the literature combining uncertainty and financial constraints
as in DLS and Bansal and Yaron (2004). Our first calibration exercise builds on DLS as a
benchmark, and incorporates a modified Bansal and Yaron (2004) uncertainty structure while
the second calibration exercise includes the preferences due to Greenwood, Hercovwitz and Huff-
man (1988). Our model’s uncertainty propagation mechanism is, however, different from other
models examining the effects of uncertainty in the presence of financial constraints. Unlike other
studies that find immediate adverse effects of uncertainty on investment and output following
uncertainty shocks that peak immediately after the innovation, we examine the impact of an
unexpected shock that does not peak immediately but rises before it falls. In our calibrated
models, agents anticipate this hump-shape uncertainty time-path once a shock has occurred.
Thereby, agents respond immediately by increasing investment (i.e. precautionary savings), but
then substantially reduce investment and consumption (and thus output) as more uncertain
times lie ahead. With persistent uncertain periods, both risk premia and bankruptcies increase,
which cause a further deterioration in investment opportunities. A hump shape time-varying
uncertainty accounts for the majority of the variation in the credit channel variables, although
the results are sensitive to the presence and the magnitude of agency costs. In the absence
of agency costs, uncertainty shocks cause expansions because there are no adverse effects for
households. However, in this case, the shocks do not explain any variation in real (<1% in
output and consumption) and financial (<3.5% in the risk premium, the bankruptcy rate and
the relative price of capital) variables. Conversely, the more severe the agency friction, i.e. the
higher the monitoring costs associated with the friction, the more important uncertainty shocks
are. We also show that accounting for hump-shape uncertainty measures can result in a large
quantitative effect of uncertainty shock relative to previous literature. We find hump-shaped
risk shocks account for 5% of the variation in output and 10% and 16% of the variation in
consumption and investment, respectively. Finally, we also analyze the role of the relative risk
aversion parameter and uncertainty. We find the relation between explained variation in output
and consumption and uncertainty is monotonic - a higher coefficient of relative risk aversion
is associated with higher precautionary savings, the associated initial expansion in output is
greater and the subsequent contraction is not as severe.
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3.2 Motivation
3.2.1 Data
Figure 3.1 shows the Financial Uncertainty and Macro Uncertainty measures proposed by Ju-
rado et al. (2015) and Ludvigson et al. (2016) from the period 1960 to 2015. Uncertainty
Figure 3.1: Financial Uncertainty and Macro Uncertainty measures from 1960 to 2015, ex-
pressed as percent deviation relative to the median.
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Source: Jurado et al. (2015) and Ludvigson et al. (2016).
shocks as defined by Jurado et al. (2015) and Ludvigson et al. (2016) (i) raise between 30%
and 73% relative to the median, (ii) exhibit a constant long-run mean and (iii) rise and fall over
time with persistence. For example, during the Great Recession period, the Financial Uncer-
tainty measure peaks after rising for 22 months (2006:12 - 2008:10) and peaks after rising for 11
months (2007:11 - 2008:10) after reaching the median during the great recession period. Other
uncertainty shocks indicated by Ludvigson et al. (2015) peak after rising for 21 months in the
late 1960s (relative to the median, from 1968:7 to the peak in 1970:4); for 26 months in the
mid 1970s (1972:11 - 1975:1); for 23 months in the late 1970s (1978:4 - 1980:3); for 10 months
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in the mid 1980s (1986:3 - 1987:1) and for 8 months in the early 1990s (1989:12 - 1990:8).2
The Macro Uncertainty proxy rose (relative to the median) for 26 months (1972:10 - 1974:12),
for 18 months (1978:11 - 1980:5) and for 17 months (2007:5 - 2008:10, with 2007:5, with the
trough before the peak slightly above the median). Consequently, the Financial Uncertainty
and Macro Uncertainty measures, depicted in Figure 3.1, strongly suggest that uncertainty is
not characterized by jumps as in Bloom (2009) but these measured uncertainty shocks show a
hump-shape time path.
3.2.2 Empirical Evidence
To show corresponding hump-shapes for output, consumption and investment, we take a sim-
plistic approach to examining the impact of uncertainty on these real variables, while avoiding
a contemporaneous jump in uncertainty. We examine the impact of a shock to future uncer-
tainty on today’s output, consumption, investment in a vector autoregression (VAR) model. In
doing so, we thus ask, what is the impact on the variables of interest if the anticipated un-
certainty is high in the future. We estimate the baseline specification of the VAR using data
from 1960Q3 to 2013Q4 with two lags and the cyclical components of output, consumption and
investment. Uncertainty is not HP-filtered and expressed as percentage deviation from the me-
dian. The results are highly similar if we use the cyclical component of HP-filtered uncertainty
or the Macro Uncertainty measure. The vector of variables included in the VAR is given by[
Uncertaintyt+k GDPt Consumptiont Investmentt
]′
with k = 2 in the baseline specifi-
cation. Figure 3.2 shows the orthogonalized impulse response functions using this specification.
Financial Uncertainty induces hump-shaped responses in output, consumption and invest-
ment. However, as opposed to previous analyses, there are no immediate adverse effects if
uncertainty is not restricted to jump unexpectedly from one period to another. Instead, a
hump-shaped expansion precedes a pronounced contraction. These results are highly robust
to different specifications and different orderings - as long as 2 ≥ k ≥ 8, i.e. if uncertainty is
high in the more distant future. If k < 2, the impulse responses show contractions in output,
consumption and investment - in line with previous work that analyzes contemporaneous jumps
in uncertainty.3
2On average, uncertainty peaks for these six shocks after increasing by 48.42%.
3These results are robust to different lag lengths of the VAR. In a second specification, we also include lagged
delinquency rates on business loans as a proxy for bankruptcies. The impulse response function of delinquencies
is hump-shaped while the responses of output consumption and investment are highly similar for the second
specification.
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Figure 3.2: Impulse Response Functions of the VAR[
Uncertaintyt+2 GDPt Consumptiont Investmentt
]′
with two lags.
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Note: Quarterly HP-filtered data from 1960 to 2015. Source: FRED and Ludvigson et al. (2016).
3.3 Model
Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997, henceforth CF) include capital-producing entrepreneurs, who de-
fault if they are not productive enough, into a real business cycles (RBC) model. In the CF
framework, households and final-goods producing firms are identical and perfectly competi-
tive. Households save by investing in a risk-neutral financial intermediary that extends loans
to entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs are heterogeneous produce capital using an idiosyncratic and
stochastic technology with constant volatility. Unlike CF, DLS introduce stochastic shocks to
the volatility (uncertainty shocks) of entrepreneurs’ technology, such that uncertainty jumps to
its peak and converges back to its steady state. While this approach remedies the procyclical
bankruptcy rates following TFP shocks it introduces countercyclical bankruptcy rates, DLS is
at odds with the measures from Jurado et al. (2015) and Ludvigson et al. (2016). In this
paper, we alter the time path and the magnitude of the shocks introduced in DLS, such that
they correspond more closely to the Macro Uncertainty and Financial Uncertainty measures.
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Following these changes, the model displays procyclical consumption, precautionary savings and
an increase in output following an initial drop. Our model therefore explains the puzzling ab-
sence of precautionary savings following uncertainty shocks in the literature, as raised by Bloom
(2014).
In the CF framework, the conversion of investment to capital is not one-to-one because
heterogeneous entrepreneurs produce capital using idiosyncratic and stochastic technology. If a
capital-producing firm realizes a low technology shock, it declares bankruptcy and the financial
intermediary takes over production after paying monitoring costs. The timing of events in the
model is as follows:
1. The exogenous state vector of technology and uncertainty shocks, denoted (At, σω,t), is
realized.
2. Firms hire inputs of labor and capital from households and entrepreneurs and produce the
final good output via a Cobb-Douglas production function.
3. Households make their labor, consumption, and investment decisions. For each unit of
investment, the household transfers qt units of the consumption goods to the banking
sector.
4. With the savings resources from households, the banking sector provide loans to en-
trepreneurs via the optimal financial contract (described below). The contract is defined by
the size of the loan, it, and a cutoff level of productivity for the entrepreneurs’ technology
shock, ω¯t.
5. Entrepreneurs use their net worth and loans from the banking sector to purchase the
factors for capital production. The quantity of investment is determined and paid for
before the idiosyncratic technology shock is known.
6. The idiosyncratic technology shock of each entrepreneur ωj,t is realized. If ωj,t ≥ ω¯t the
entrepreneur is solvent and the loan from the bank is repaid; otherwise the entrepreneur
declares bankruptcy and production is monitored by the bank at a cost proportional to
the input, µit.
7. Solvent entrepreneur’s sell their remaining capital output to the bank sector and use this
income to purchase consumption cet and (entrepreneurial) capital zt. The latter will in
part determine their net worth nt in the following period.
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3.3.1 The Impact of Uncertainty Shocks: Partial Equilibrium
The optimal contract is given by the combination of it and ω¯t that maximizes entrepreneurs’
return subject to participating intermediaries. Financial intermediaries make zero profits due
to free entry
max
it,ω¯t
qtitf(ω¯t;σω,t) (3.1)
subject to
qtitg(ω¯t;σω,t) ≥ it − nt. (3.2)
Net worth is defined as
nt = w
e
t + zt(rt + qt(1− δ(ut))), (3.3)
Entrepreneurs’ share of the expected net capital output is
f(ω¯t;σω,t) =
∫ ∞
ω¯t
ωφ˜(ω¯t;σω,t)dω − [1− Φ˜(ω¯t;σω,t)]ω¯t (3.4)
and the lenders’ share of expected net capital output
g(ω¯t;σω,t) =
∫ ω¯t
0
ωφ˜(ω¯t;σω,t)dω + [1− Φ˜(ω¯t;σω,t)]ω¯t − Φ˜(ω¯t;σω,t)µ. (3.5)
To understand the impact of an uncertainty shock, consider the uncertainty shock in partial
equilibrium. For this analysis, q and n are assumed to be fixed while i and ω are chosen. In this
setting, uncertainty shocks adversely affect the supply of investment as follows. As σω increases,
the default threshold ω and lenders’ expected return fall. From the incentive compatibility
constraint of entrepreneurs’ problem (3.1), it can be seen that investment has to fall. The effect
of an uncertainty shock is summarized graphically, and contrasted with an aggregate technology
shock, in Figure 3.3 (taken from DLS).
Whether these results carry over in general equilibrium depends on how the shock is modeled.
They are not overturned following a jump in uncertainty, as analyzed in DLS, or if uncertainty
reaches its peak quickly. In this case, bankruptcies, the associated agency costs, the risk premium
and the price of capital increase. The return to investing falls, saving/investing is less attractive,
so investment and output drop while households substitute into consumption. These results are
overturned, however, following a shock that is hump-shaped if the peak is sufficiently far in the
future.
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Figure 3.3: The partial equilibrium impact of an uncertainty shock.
Note: Uncertainty adversely affects capital supply, in contrast to TFP shocks that affect capital
demand. Source: DLS.
3.3.2 Modeling Hump-Shaped Uncertainty Shocks
We allow for humps in uncertainty by modifying a subset of equations due to Bansal and Yaron
(2004), such that a latent xt variable affects σω,t:
log(σω,t+1) = (1− ρσω) log(σ¯ω) + ρσω log(σω,t) + ε˜t+1 (3.6)
ε˜t+1 = ϕσεσ,t+1 + xt+1 (3.7)
xt+1 = ρxxt + ϕxεx,t+1 (3.8)
εx,t, εσ,t
i.i.d.∼ N(0, 1), ρσ, ρx ∈ [0, 1). (3.9)
ε˜t+1 is a composite term that enables uncertainty to jump (innovations in the first term
ϕσ,t+1εσ,t+1), as in DLS, or increase over time corresponding to the empirical proxies (innovations
via the latent variable xt+1). Figure 3.4 plots the time series of σω,t using different persistence
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parameters ρx = [0, 0.5, 0.94, 0.96]. The horizontal axis measures time in monthly periods, while
the vertical axis shows the percentage deviation from the steady state. Setting ρx = 0 induces a
jump in uncertainty, as analyzed in DLS. The larger ρx, the more pronounced the hump in σω,t
and the longer uncertainty rises before it peaks.
Figure 3.4: Modeling Uncertainty Shocks using different persistence parameters.
Note: The horizontal axis shows monthly periods, while the vertical axis shows the percentage
deviation from the steady state. The case with ρx = 0 corresponds to a jump in uncertainty
as analyzed in DLS. The higher ρx, the more pronounced the hump in uncertainty. In the
benchmark case with ρx = .96, σω peaks after rising 25 months, corresponding to the empirical
evidence. ρσω is set to 0.9
1/3.
In the benchmark case with ρx = .96, uncertainty peaks after rising for 25 months, corre-
sponding to the empirical evidence. We match the innovation relative to the steady state using
the average increase of an uncertainty shock relative to the long-run mean: We set ϕx = 0.048
such that σω,t increases by 48% relative to the steady state. Our 48% relative increase com-
pares with previous papers as follows. In Bloom (2009) and Bloom, Alfaro and Lin (2016),
who use two-state Markov chains to examine the impact of uncertainty, σω increases by 100%;
in Bloom, Floetotto, Jaimovich, Saporta-Eksten and Terry (2012), σω increases between 91%
and 330%. Leduc and Liu (2015) introduce an increase of 39.2% relative to the steady state.
Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2014), use a combination of un- and anticipated innovations
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over a sequence of eight quarters, and their magnitude of these innovations is between 2.83%
and 10% per period. DLS use a 1% innovation, Chugh (2016) and Bachmann and Bayer (2013)
examine increases of about 4%, while Dmitriev and Hoddenbagh (2015) use a 3% innovation.
These differences are partially driven by differences in measurement; see also Strobel (2015).
Not surprisingly, greater innovations in uncertainty are associated with a greater role of uncer-
tainty in terms of variation explained. One special case is the model of Christiano et al. (2014)
who introduce a news component to their shocks: Sims (2015) points out potential issues in
using news and variance decompositions. Lee, Salyer and Strobel (2016) show that the news
component plays a prominent role regarding the importance of uncertainty.
3.3.3 The Impact of Uncertainty Shocks: General Equilibrium
In order to unambiguously identify the change in the impact of a risk shock that is due to its
hump-shape, we insert the shock described in the previous section in a framework identical to
DLS. For this reason, the model’s exposition is confined to the agents’ optimization problems.
The representative household’s objective is to maximize expected utility by choosing consump-
tion ct, labor ht and savings kt+1, i.e.
max
{ct,kt+1,ht}∞0
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
ln(ct) + ν(1− ht)
]
(3.10)
subject to
wtht + rtkt ≥ ct + qtit (3.11)
kt+1 = (1− δ)kt + it (3.12)
with wt the wage and rt the rental rate of capital. These are equal to their marginal products,
as the representative final-good’s producing firm faces a standard, static profit maximization
problem4
max
Kt,Ht,Het
AtKt
αKHαHt (H
e
t )
1−αK−αH − rtKt − wtHt − wetHet , (3.13)
with Kt = kt/η and Ht = (1 − η)ht, where η represents the fraction of entrepreneurs in the
economy. Total Factor Productivity (TFP) At follows an autoregressive process of order one in
logs,
log(At+1) = ρA log(At) + ϕAεA,t+1 (3.14)
4When solving the model, we follow DLS and assume the share of entrepreneurs labor (1 − αK − αH) is
approximately zero.
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Table 3.1: Benchmark calibration for the monthly frequency.
Parameter Function Value Rationale / Source (see also discussion in the text)
β Discount rate 0.9975 Monthly calibration
α Capital’s share of production 0.36 DLS
µ Monitoring costs 0.25 DLS
δ Depreciation rate 0.2/3 DLS
σω Steady state uncertainty 0.207 Steady State Risk Premium
ρσω Persistence parameter uncertainty 0.9
1/3 DLS
ρx Persistence parameter hump component 0.96 Jurado et al (2015), Ludvigson et al (2016)
ϕσ Innovation in uncertainty (jump) 0.01 DLS
ϕx Innovation in uncertainty (hump) 0.048 Jurado et al (2015), Ludvigson et al (2016)
$ Steady state default threshold 0.557 Steady State Bankruptcy Rate
with εA,t
i.i.d.∼ N(0, 1). The problem of entrepreneurs is given by
max
{cet ,zt+1}∞0
E0
∞∑
t=0
(γβ)tcet (3.15)
subject to
nt = w
e
t + zt(rt + qt(1− δ)) (3.16)
zt+1 = nt[
f(ω¯t, σω,t)
1− qtg(ω¯t, σω,t) ]−
cet
qt
. (3.17)
The entrepeurs are risk neutral and supply one unit of labor inelastically. Their net worth
is defined by sum of labor income wet , the income from capital ztrt plus the remaining capital
ztqt(1−δ). At the end of a period, entrepreneurial consumption is financed out of the returns from
the investment project, which implies the law of motion (3.17). As the equilibrium conditions
are described in DLS, we will not list them in this section.
3.3.4 Calibration
We calibrate the model for the monthly frequency. Otherwise, the frequency of uncertainty would
be too low relative to the empirical counterparts. Table 3.1 shows the benchmark calibration
of the key parameters. The household’s monthly discount rate of 0.9975 implies an annual risk
free rate of about 3%. Following DLS, we set σω = 0.207, which implies an annual risk premium
of 1.98%. The slight increase in the risk premium, which is 1.87% in DLS, is due to changes
associated with the monthly calibration. The default threshold $ targets an annual bankruptcy
rate of 3.90%, as in DLS.
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3.3.5 Cyclical Behaviour
Because of the assumption on entrepreneurs’ productivity, first order approximation of the
equilibrium conditions does not impose certainty equivalence. Instead, uncertainty (time-varying
second moment) appears in the policy function as a state variable. Figures 3.5 and 3.6 show the
impulse response functions following jumps and humps in uncertainty, i.e. the impulse response
function for different values of ρx = [0, 0.5, 0.94, 0.96].
Figure 3.5: Impulse responses of output, household consumption and investment following an
uncertainty shock for different persistence parameters, ρx = [0, 0.5, 0.96, 0.979].
Note: The horizontal axis shows monthly periods, the vertical axis shows the percentage devia-
tion from the steady state.
If ρx = 0, uncertainty jumps to its peak and an immediate drop in investment and output
ensues, which is expected from the partial equilibrium analysis. Household consumption coun-
terfactually increases as households substitute into consumption. The larger ρx, the longer the
shock takes to peak. Interestingly, there is a threshold value of ρx that is necessary to induce
prevautionary savings. For instance, ρx = 0.5 is insufficient to overcome the partial equilib-
rium results and to induce precautionary savings. However, values of ρx corresponding to the
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Figure 3.6: Impulse responses of the risk premium, the bankruptcy rate, return to investment and
the relative price of capital following an uncertainty shock for different persistence parameters,
ρx = [0, 0.5, 0.96, 0.979].
Note: The horizontal axis shows monthly periods, the vertical axis shows the percentage devia-
tion from the steady state, unless indicated otherwise.
uncertainty proxies overturn the partial equilibrium results: An uncertainty shocks is followed
by an increase in investment and a hump-shape response of output following the initial drop.
Moreover, in line with the data, consumption is procyclical. The intuition is that immediately
after the shock, agency costs are still moderate relative to future periods so investment demand
increases, which raises output following the initial drop. While households also substitute into
consumption, entrepreneurs greatly reduce consumption after an uncertainty shock because of
the increase probability of default and because the higher price of capital results in an increase
in investment. The intuition of the model can also be seen in the context of the agency friction.
Figure 3.7 shows the impulse responses for different values of µ.
Without agency friction, µ = 0 (actually, for computational reasons, µ = 0.0001), the
relative price of capital qt is unity. An uncertainty shock, then, induces an expansion in output,
consumption and investment because there are no adverse effects for households. Although
the bankruptcy rate increases, there are no adverse effects. Instead, households benefit from a
more productive investment opportunity. If there are agency costs (µ > 0), the relative price of
capital qt increases, as well as risk premia and bankruptcy rates. In this case, households incur
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Figure 3.7: Impulse responses of output, consumption and investment following an uncertainty
shock for different magnitudes of monitoring costs, µ=[0.0001, 0.125, 0.2, 0.25].
Note: The horizontal axis shows monthly periods, the vertical axis shows the percentage devia-
tion from the steady state.
adverse effects of bankruptcies because of the monitoring costs Φ˜(µω, σω)µ. Unlike shocks that
jump, however, hump-shaped shocks increase investment by around 1.7% relative to the steady
state, despite the price-increase associated with the agency friction - overturning the partial
equilibrium effects. Since expectations are rational, households know that uncertain times of
relatively poor investment opportunities are ahead, so they substantially increase saving as soon
as they learn about the shock. As shown in Figure 3.7, the magnitude of the initial increase is
inversely related to the size of µ - the higher the monitoring costs, the more capital is destroyed.
Without agency friction, consumption does not increase by much in order to invest more. With
agency friction and adverse effects of uncertainty for the households, consumption increases the
more the greater µ. The initial increase in investment leads to an expansion in output. However,
the subsequent deterioration of conditions in the credit channel leads to a drop in investment
and to a contraction in output.
Table 3.2 presents the model’s correlation coefficients. The model produces procyclical con-
sumption and investment if uncertainty is not restricted to jump; the degree of procyclicality
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Table 3.2: Correlation coefficients of consumption, investment, bankruptcy rate and uncertainty
with output.
Correlation with y
Uncertainty Shock c i BR σω
Jump -0.72 0.95 -0.99 -0.69
Hump 0.19 0.88 -0.97 -0.95
Note: BR refers to the bankruptcy rate. The autocorrelation coefficient of uncertainty is ρσω =
0.91/3, as in DLS, while uncertainty peaks after rising for 25 months, i.e. ρx = 0.96.
of consumption depends on the persistence of the latent variable, i.e. on how long the shock
takes to peak. The bankruptcy rate and uncertainty are strongly countercyclical for both types
of risk shocks.
3.4 GHH Preferences and Variable Capital Utilization
The previous section uses the framework of DLS to emphasize the impact of hump-shaped uncer-
tainty shocks: precautionary savings, a hump-shape response of output with a short expansion
that is followed by a longer and persistent contraction as well as mildly procyclical consump-
tion. However, the initial drop in output that precedes the short expansion is much stronger
compared to the VAR evidence, while the procyclicality of consumption is senstive to the persis-
tence parameter of the latent variable. To remedy these features, we modify the model by using
the preferences due to Greenwood, Hercowitz and Huffman (1988), to eliminate effects of labor
supply due to changes in consumption, and allow for variable capital utilization. The represen-
tative household thus chooses the capital utilization rate ut, which is impacts the depretation
rate δ(ut), with δ
′(ut), δ′′(ut) > 0. The problem is given by
max
{ct,kt+1,ut,ht}∞0
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt(1− ι)−1[ct − χ h1+θt
(1 + θ)
]1−ι
(3.18)
subject to
wtht + rt(utkt) ≥ ct + qtit (3.19)
kt+1 = (1− δ(ut))kt + it (3.20)
δ(ut) = δ0 + δ1(ut − 1) + δ2
2
(ut − 1)2. (3.21)
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Table 3.3: Benchmark calibration for the monthly frequency with GHH preferences and variable
capital utilization.
Parameter Function Value Rationale / Source (see also discussion in the text)
ι Coefficient of relative risk aversion 1 Greenwood et al. (1988)
1/θ Intertemporal elasticity of substitution in labor supply 0.8 Greenwood et al. (1988)
χ Relative importance of leisure 9.8930 Household works 1/3 of his time
δ0 Steady state rate of capital depreciation 0.02/3 DLS
δ1 Normalize steady state capital utilization 0.0108 Capital utilization is unity in steady state
δ2 Sensitivity of capital utilization 0.2 Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2008)*
∗Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2008) estimate δ2 = 0.11 but with a relatively large standard error of 0.26. We set δ2
slightly higher to restrict capital utilization a bit more given the monthly calibration.
The coefficient of relative risk aversion is given by ι, while 1/θ corresponds to the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution in labor supply. χ is the relative importance of leisure. The problem
of the final-goods’ producing firms is given by
max
utKt,Ht,Het
At(utKt)
αKHαHt (H
e
t )
1−αK−αH − rt(utKt)− wtHt − wetHet . (3.22)
The problem of the entrepreneurs and the optimal contract remain unchanged for the most part,
except for the depreciation rate, δ(ut). The calibration of the additional parameters is standard
and displayed in Table 3.3. The set of equations determining the equilibrium properties are
displayed in the Appendix.
3.4.1 Cyclical Behaviour
While the previous section examined an identical economy as DLS, we now consider the impact
of the different types of uncertainty shock using the preferences due to Greenwood et al. (1988)
to remedy the shortcomings discussed above. We examine the impact on output, investment
and household consumption following an innovation that is comparable in magnitude (a 48%
innovation). Consider first the impact of the hump-shaped shock displayed in Figure 3.8. The
results are quite robust, although the initial adverse impact on output is much smaller while
the brief ensuing expansion is (relative to the DLS framework) more pronounced and persistent.
However, as shown in Table 3.4 below, the procyclicality of consumption is not senstive anymore
to uncertainty’s time to peak. In contrast, the results change following a jump in uncertainty.
Most notably, while output drops as expected, investment increases in the first period, mitigating
the drop in output, but then drops persistently below its steady state and output falls again.
This is not due to precautionary savings, however. If there is a jump in uncertainty, the amount of
capital destroyed immediately after the shock is much larger compared to a hump-shaped shock
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(total costs of default following a jump are more than twice as large after the first two years,
which also shows in the bankruptcy rate in Figure 3.9).5 Labor, however, is not substituted for
capital (labor perfectly comoves with output given the GHH preferences) but the capital stock
is simply replaced. This is also reflected by the marginal product of capital, which increases
following a jump in uncertainty whereas it falls following a hump in uncertainty.
Figure 3.8: Impulse responses of output, household consumption and investment following a
shock (jump and hump) to uncertainty.
Note: Uncertainty increases by 48% for both types of uncertainty shock. The horizontal axis
shows monthly periods, the vertical axis shows the percentage deviation from the steady state.
Table 3.4 presents a further analysis of the equilibrium characteristics. The model produces
procyclical consumption and investment for TFP and risk shocks. As discussed above, this
is partially due to the GHH preferences, which are also the reason for perfect comovement of
labor and output. As opposed to Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), the bankruptcy rate is counter-
cyclical for both types of uncertainty shocks. This similarity conceals the fact that following a
hump-shaped uncertainty shock, the bankruptcy rate is initially procyclical and becomes coun-
tercyclical only later on. The reason is that uncertainty starts to rise while output still expands
due to the initial increase in investment. While uncertainty rises, investment and output de-
5Not surprisingly, the marginal product of capital increases following a jump while it initially drops (and is
positive only in later periods) following a hump.
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Figure 3.9: Lending channel variables following a shock (jump and hump) to uncertainty.
Note: Uncertainty increases by 48% for both types of uncertainty shock. The horizontal axis
shows monthly periods, the vertical axis shows the percentage deviation from the steady state,
unless indicated otherwise.
crease. In contrast, if uncertainty jumps to its peak, output immediately decreases.6 Similary,
although the correlation between output and uncertainty for the two shocks is not that different,
the dynamics are following a shock are.
The correlation of the bankruptcy rate and output implied by the model is considerably
higher compared to the data, while the correlation between output and consumption is fairly
close to the data for hump-shaped uncertainty shocks. The correlation between output and
investment is considerably lower compared to the data because investment is the main driver of
the dynamics and leads output. The relative volatilities implied by both types of uncertainty
shock are too high for consumption, investment and uncertainty and much lower for hours and
bankruptcies, compared to the data. Thus, even though uncertainty, in this model, accounts for
the majority of the variation in bankruptcies, uncertainty shocks are not sufficient to explain
the observed relative variation. Considering the simplicity of the model and that uncertainty on
its own is an unlikely source of bankruptcies, this finding is not too surprising.
6Note also that the hump-shaped movements in bankruptcy rates observed in the data are absent if uncertainty
moves from steady state to peak from one period to another - simply because of the time path of σω,t and the
log-normality assumption of entrepreneurs’ productivity. Conversely, they are, to a large extent, present by
construction following a hump-shaped shock.
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Table 3.4: Business Cycle Characteristics.
Volatility relative to σ(y) Correlation with y
Shock σ(y) c i BR σω c i BR σω
TFP 0.20 0.65 4.66 0.003 - 0.96 0.93 0.23 -
Risk Jump 0.00046 1.48 11.60 0.42 15.12 0.55 0.40 -0.13 -0.33
Risk Hump 0.038 0.98 10.66 0.14 17.65 0.89 0.46 -0.27 -0.28
U.S. Data 2.04 0.47 4.03 14.08 7.36 0.78 0.87 -0.81 -0.09∗
Note: BR refers to the bankruptcy rate. For this analysis, the innovations to the shocks are
such that uncertainty jumps by 1%, as in DLS, and increases over time up to 48% as suggested
by the empricial evidence. TFP is highly persistent with an autocorrelation coefficient of 0.91/3,
and subject to an innovation of 1%. Although the model is calibrated and simulated for 10,000
months, we present quarterly statistics by computing the three month averages. The U.S. Fig-
ures for output, consumption, investment and labor are from Dorofeenko et al. (2016). The
statistics for bankruptcies and uncertainty are based on own calculations. For the bankruptcy
rate, we use use quarterly data from 1987Q1 to 2013Q4 and the delinquency rate as a proxy.
For uncertainty, we use the Financial Uncertainty measure from 1960 until 2015.
∗The correlation between output and Macro Uncertainty from 1960Q3 to 2014Q2 is -0.21.
Source: FRED, Jurado et al. (2015) and Ludvigson et al. (2016).
Table 3.5: Variance Decomposition: Hump-shaped uncertainty shocks, TFP shocks and the
coefficient of relative risk aversion ι.
y c i
ι TFP Hump TFP Hump TFP Hump
1 94.92 5.08 89.16 10.84 82.40 17.60
2 96.27 3.73 93.31 6.69 87.03 12.97
10 96.88 3.12 95.93 4.07 91.96 8.04
20 96.67 3.33 96.06 3.94 93.27 6.73
Note: Hump refers to uncertainty shocks that are hump-shaped. For emphasis, this analysis
omits jumping uncertainty shocks.
Table 3.5 shows the relation between the coefficient of relative risk aversion ι and the role of
uncertainty, which is (inversely) monotonically related. The higher ι,the more agents save as a
precaution. The associated initial expansion in output is therefore also greater the higher ι, and
the subsequent contraction is not as severe; the volatility of consumption is much smaller the
higher ι, and for very high values of ι consumption negatively deviates from the steady state.
For this reason, the (unconditional) variation in output, consumption and investment due to the
hump-shape shock is the lower the more risk-averse households are - the initial impact is larger
but subsequently the overall variation is diminished.
Finally, to assess the relative importance of TFP and uncertainty in the context of the
agency friction, Table 3.6 shows the variance decomposition for different values of µ. Without
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agency friction, neither type of uncertainty shock matters. Introducing the friction and setting
µ = 0.125, uncertainty overall plays a small role for output (1.7%), a non-negligible role for con-
sumption (7%) and it quantitatively matters for investment (20%). Lending-channel variables,
in turn, are much more strongly affected, while productivity shocks accounting for less than one
percent of the variation in risk premium and bankruptcy rates. Unsurprisingly, the importance
of uncertainty for financial variables remains high as monitoring costs (µ = 0.25) double. How-
ever, in terms of real variables, uncertainty accounts for 7% of the variation in output, 20% and
25% of the variation in consumption and investment, respectively. In comparison to each other,
hump-shaped shaped uncertainty accounts for the lion’s share in real variables, explaining 5%,
10% and 16% of the total variation in output, consumption and investment, respectively. The
lending-channel variables are more strongly affected by unexpected changes in uncertainty, with
85% of the variation in bankruptcy rates and 60% of the variation in the risk premium due to
shocks that jump.
3.5 Conclusion
We model uncertainty shocks that rise and fall over time. This approach to modeling uncer-
tainty shocks is based on empirical evidence due to Jurado et al. (2015) and Ludvigson et
al. (2016). Hump-shaped uncertainty shocks result in a different propagation mechanism com-
pared to previous work combining uncertainty and financial accelerator models. The model’s
propagation mechanism resembels business cycles if uncertainty is combined with an agency fric-
tion. Changes in the investment supply drive these dynamics. We find that uncertainty shocks,
calibrated corresponding to the data, play a non-negligible role for the variation in real and
financial variables: they explain 5% of the variation in output and 10% and 16% of the variation
in consumption and investment. Comparing the two uncertainty shocks with each other, we find
hump-shape uncertainty to matter more strongly for the real variables, while unexpected shocks
dominate the lending channel variables. In any case, the contraction and subsequent sluggish
recovery due to hump-shaped uncertainty shocks resemble features observed in the recent crisis:
there is an expansion, followed by a contraction and a sluggish recovery. We foresee further
research in the following line. First, agents in the model anticipate the time path of uncertainty
after a shock has occurred. Thus, replacing rational expectations with a learning mechanism
could be an interesting extension. Moreover, examining the impact of uncertainty shocks in the
context of both equity and debt finance, as in Covas and den Haan (2012), might provide further
insights into the choice between different sources of external finance.
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3.6 Appendix
3.6.1 Optimality Conditions
The final goods’ production firm’s production function is given by
yt = At(ktut)
α((1− η)ht)1−α (3.23)
The aggregate resource constraint is
yt = (1− η)ct + ηcet + ηit (3.24)
The aggregate law of motion is given by
Kt+1 = (1− δ(ut))Kt + ηit(1− Φ˜µ) (3.25)
which is equivalent to
kt+1 = (1− δ(ut))kt + it(1− Φ˜µ) (3.26)
with
δ(ut) = δ0 + δ1(ut − 1) + δ2
2
(ut − 1)2 (3.27)
The household’s problem is described in the text. The intertemporal optimality conditions
of the household are as follows:
• Intratemporal optimality
χhθt = At(1− α)(ktut)α((1− η)ht)−α (3.28)
• Intertemporal optimality
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qt(ct − χh1+θt /(1 + θ))−ι =
βE{(ct+1 − χh1+θt+1/(1 + θ))−ι(At+1α(kt+1ut+1)α−1((1− η)ht+1)1−αut+1 + qt+1(1− δ(ut+1)))}
(3.29)
• The stochastic discount factor is given by
mt,t+1 = E{β
(ct+1 − χh1+θt+1/(1 + θ))−ι
(ct − χh1+θt /(1 + θ))−ι
} (3.30)
• The return on investment is
Rkt,t+1 =
(At+1α(kt+1ut+1)
α−1((1− η)ht+1)1−αut+1 + qt+1(1− δ(ut+1)))
qt
(3.31)
• The optimal level of capital utilization is
ut = 1 + (
Atα(ktut)
α−1((1− η)ht)1−α
qt
− δ1)/δ2 (3.32)
• The risk premium is
riskpr = qRkt,t+1 − 1 = q
ω¯t
1− (1− qg(ω¯t, σω,t)) − 1 =
ω¯t
g(ω¯t, σω,t)
− 1 (3.33)
The optimal contract, the solution to the problem (3.1) subject to participating lenders,
determines investment and the default threshold. Entrepreneurs with nt > 0 borrow it − nt
units of consumption and pay back (1+r
k)(it−nt)
it
≡ ω¯t which is possible if ωt ≥ ω¯t. The first
order necessary conditions are given by
qt =
1
(1− Φ˜(ω¯t;σω,t))µ+ φ˜(ω¯t;σω,t)µf(ω¯t, σω,t)/∂f(ω¯t,σω,t)∂ω¯t
(3.34)
which governs the default threshold ω¯ as a function of q as well as the leverage ratio
it =
1
1− qtg(ω¯t, σω,t)nt (3.35)
which determines investment i(ω¯(q), q, n) and ensures incentive compatibility.
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Entrepreneurs’ intertemporal efficiency results from maximizing entrepreneurial consump-
tion, which is linear in cet .
qt = βγEt[qt+1(1− δ(ut+1)) +At+1α(ut+1kt+1)α−1((1− η)ht+1)1−α( qt+1f(ω¯t+1, σω,t+1)
1− qt+1g(ω¯t+1, σω,t+1))]
(3.36)
The law of motion of entrepreneurs’ capital zt+1 is given by the equations
ηnt = zt[qt(1− δ(ut)) +Atα(utkt)α−1((1− η)ht)1−α] (3.37)
zt+1 = ηnt[
f(ω¯t, σω,t)
1− qtg(ω¯t, σω,t) ]− η
cet
qt
(3.38)
3.6.2 Computation of the Steady State
In order to solve the model, I set the steady state default threshold as the inverse of the log-
normal distribution for a given target default, which is 0.039/12
$ = Φ˜−1(0.039/12, σω) (3.39)
Given $, the steady state bankruptcy rate is the log-normal distribution with µω = −σ2ω/2.
Entrepreneurs’ share of net capital output is the partial expectation of a log-normally dis-
tributed variable
f($;σω) = Φ(
− log($)− σ2ω/2 + σ2ω
σω
)− (1− Φ˜($;σω))$ (3.40)
where Φ denotes the normal distribution.
The lenders’ share is
g($;σω) = 1− f($;σω)− Φ˜($;σω)µ (3.41)
The steady state relative price of capital is
q =
1
1− Φ˜($;σω)µ+ φ˜($;σω)µf($;σω)/(Φ˜($;σω)− 1)
(3.42)
which in turn determines γ, which prevents self-financing entrepreneurs
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γ =
1− qg($;σω)
qf($;σω)
(3.43)
and steady state risk premium
riskpr =
$
g($;σω)
− 1 (3.44)
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Chapter 4
Housing and Macroeconomy: The
Role of Credit Channel, Risk -,
Demand - and Monetary Shocks
4.1 Introduction
Figure 4.1 shows the dramatic rise and fall of real housing prices for the U.S. and some of the
selected European countries1 from the first quarter of 1997 to the second quarter of 2011. The
U.S. housing market peaked in the second quarter of 2007 with the price appreciation of 122%.2
In comparison to Ireland (300 %), Greece (185%), and Spain (163%) and with each country
having slightly different peak periods, the U.S. housing price appreciation is not only in-line
with the rest of the economies but also is relatively mild3. With the subsequent pronounced
decline in house prices in these economies from their peaks during the mid 2000’s, there is a
growing body of literature that describes these large swings in housing prices as bubbles or these
sharp increases in housing prices were caused by irrational exuberance4, and subsequently, these
1We have selected Ireland, Spain, Greece, Italy and Portugal for our illustration purpose. Moreover, these
countries are purposely chosen as most of them are currently experiencing a great financial difficulties. We also
include Germany, who has not experienced any housing or financial crisis, to use as a benchmark comparison.
2Unlike the Case-Shiller index that has an appreciation of 122%, the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Over-
sight (OFHEO) experienced 77% appreciation. The difference between the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise
Oversight (OFHEO) and Case-Shiller housing price indices arises largely from the treatment of expensive homes.
The OFHEO index includes only transactions involving mortgages backed by the lenders it oversees, Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac, which are capped at $417,000. The Case-Shiller measure has no upper limit and gives more
weight to higher-priced homes.
3The following countries have experienced less of an appreciation: Portugal (44%), Italy (70%) and Germany
(-4.2%) with even depreciation.
4The term Irrational Exuberance was first coined by Alan Greenspan, the former chairman of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve in 1996 at the U.S. Congress testimony.
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housing price bubbles then are the causes of the recent global financial instability.
Figure 4.1: Real housing prices for the U.S. and selected European countries from 1997 until
2007.
Source: BIS and ECB.
Given the recent macroeconomic experience of most developed countries, few students of
the economy would argue with the following three observations: 1. Financial intermediation
plays an important role in the economy, 2. The housing sector is a critical component for
aggregate economic behavior and 3. Uncertainty, and, in particular, time-varying uncertainty5 -
and monetary shocks are quantitatively important sources of business cycle activity. And while
there has no doubt been a concomitant increase in economic research which examines housing
markets and financial intermediation, only a few analyses have been conducted in a calibrated,
general equilibrium setting; i.e. an economic environment in which the quantitative properties
of the model are broadly consistent with observed business cycle characteristics with various
shocks.6 The objective of our paper is to develop a theoretical and computational framework
5We define and estimate these uncertainty (risk) shocks as the time variation in the cross sectional distribution
of firm level productivities. The detail analysis of the risk shock estimation follows in the later section.
6Some of the recent works which also examine housing and credit are: Iacoviello and Minetti (2008) and
Iacoviello and Neri (2010) in which a new-Keynesian DGSE two sector model is used in their empirical analysis;
Iacoviello (2005) analyzes the role that real estate collateral has for monetary policy; and Aoki, Proudman and
Vlieghe (2004) analyze house price amplification effects in consumption and housing investment over the business
cycle. None of these analyses use risk shocks as an impulse mechanism. Some recent papers that have examined
the effects of uncertainty in a DSGE framework include Bloom et al. (2012), Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2009),
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that can help us understand: [1] how does uncertainty in lending channel effect economies
(including both financial and housing markets) at different stages of business cycle; [2] what
are the effcts associated with credit constrained heterogenous agents on the housing prices and
the business cycle; and [3] what types monetary policies might help (or hinder) the process of
housing and financial development.
To address the aforementioned questions, we use the framework of the housing supply/banking
sector model as developed in Dorofeenko, Lee, and Salyer (2014) with the model of housing de-
mand presented in Iacoviello and Neri (2010). In particular, we examine how the factors of
production uncertainty, financial intermediation, and credit constrained households can affect
housing prices and aggregate economic activity. Moreover, this analysis is cast within a mone-
tary framework of Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001) which permits a study of how monetary policy
can be used to mitigate the deleterious effects of cyclical phenomenon that originates in the
housing sector.
The Dorofeenko, Lee, and Salyer (2014) model focuses on the effects that housing produc-
tion uncertainty and bank lending have on housing prices. To do this, their analysis combines
the multi-sector housing model of Davis and Heathcote (2005) with the Carlstrom and Fuerst
(1997) model of lending under asymmetric information and agency costs since both models had
been shown to replicate several key features of the business cycle. In particular, the Davis and
Heathcote (2005) model produces the high volatility of residential investment relative to fixed
business investment seen in the data. However, the model fails to produce the observed volatility
in housing prices. To this basic framework, Dorofeenko, Lee, and Salyer (2014) introduce an
additional impulse mechanism, time varying uncertainty (i.e. risk shocks) shocks to the stan-
dard deviation of the entrepreneurs’ technology shock affecting only the housing production, and
require that housing producers finance the purchase of their inputs via bank loans. Dorofeenko,
Lee, and Salyer (2014) model risk shocks as a mean preserving spread in the distribution of
the technology shocks affecting only house production and explore quantitatively how changes
in uncertainty affect equilibrium characteristics.7 The importance of understanding how these
uncertainty or risk shocks affect the economy is widely discussed in academics and among pol-
icymakers. For example, Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2012) demonstrates that a long persistent
sluggish economic recovery in the U.S. (e.g. low output growth and unemployment hovering
Christiano et al. (2015), and Dorofeenko, Lee and Salyer (2014) with housing markets.
7One should note that the time varying risk shocks in this paper are quite different than the pure aggregate
or sectoral technology (supply) shocks. First, risk shocks affect only the housing production sector. Second, risk
shocks are meant to represent the second moments of the variance. That is, these time varying risk shocks proxy
the changes in eocnomic environment uncertainty.
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above 8%) even after the bottoming of the U.S. recession in June 2009 could be attributed to
the high levels of uncertainty about economic policy.
In Dorofeenko, Lee, and Salyer (2014), these factors lead to greater house price volatility as
housing prices reflect potential losses due to bankruptcy for some housing producers. In fact,
the model is roughly consistent with the cyclical behavior of residential investment and housing
prices as seen in U.S. data over the sample period 1975-2010. However, Dorofeenko, Lee, and
Salyer (2014) model is not consistent with the behavior of housing prices and firm bankruptcy
rates as seen in the recent decade. This failure is not surprising since the role of shocks to housing
demand combined with changes in household mortgage finance are not present. Consequently,
in this paper, we embed key features of the recent model by Iacoviello and Neri (2010) to rectify
this omisssion. As detailed below, the main features of the Iacoviello and Neri (2010) model
that we employ are the introduction of heterogenous agents (patient and impatient), a borrowing
constraint (which affects impatient households) and a monetary authority that targets inflation
via interest rate. We then introduce housing demand shocks (via preferences) and examine how
these get transmitted to the economy. Next we examine optimal monetary policy in this setting.
In analyzing the role of the LTV (Loan to Value) ratio on macro and housing variables, we
present three different scenarios that are based on LTV ratio: low (80), middle (85) and high
(90) borrowing constraints. These different levels of LTV ratio are, for an expositional purpose,
to reflect three different European economies: Germany, Italy and Spain. According to IMF
(2011) (also shown in Table 4.5 in the Appendix), Germans have one of the lowest LTV ratio,
whereas Spanish borrowers have one of the highest LTV ratio with Italy being in between these
two levels.8
Unlike some of the recent literature that emphasize the important role of the level of LTV
on housing market, our results indicate otherwise: almost no differences between different levels
of LTV on the variables that we analyze. On the role of specifi shocks, we show that the effects
of monetary shocks are huge on most of the macro variables and in particular on the housing
investment and the amount of borrowing the households undertake: over 75 % and almost 50 %
of the variation in housing investment and borrowing can be explained by the monetary shocks.
On the contrary to monetary shocks, housing demand shocks have a trivial impact on all the
variables that we analyze: at most 6 % of the variation in housing price can be explained by
the preference shocks. Lastly, our endogenous debt financial accelerator model with risk shocks
lends a strong support for the important role of risk shocks: over 85 % of the variation in housing
8Some of the recent housing market developments for various European countries are discussed in the Appendix.
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price is due to risk shocks. Our results, thus, show that there is a clear and an important role
for the policy makers to smooth housing price and/or housing investment: to calm markets and
to provide and restore market confidence.
4.2 Model: Housing Markets, Financial Intermediation, and
Monetary Policy
Our model builds on three separate strands of literature: Davis and Heathcote’s (2005) multi-
sector growth model with housing, Dorofeenko, Lee and Salyer’s (2008, 2014) credit channel
model with uncertainty, and Iacoviello and Neri’s (2010) model of housing demand. In this
paper, however, we do not consider any other New Keynesian economic frictions other than the
asymmetric information friction that occurs in the loan contract between the mutual fund and
entrepreneurs.
First we specify the households’ optimization problem in a representative agent economy in
which the demand for money is motivated by a cash-in-advance constraint. Then, this environ-
ment is modified by dividing the households into two groups, patient and impatient (a´ la Ia-
coviello and Neri’s (2010)) . This will introduce a role for household lending and borrowing. We
then introduce financial intermediation (”banking”) sector, where the patient households lend
savings to bankers, and the bankers then lend to both impatient households and entrepreneurs
(housing producing agents). With the banking sector, the state of the economy (which is mea-
sured in this paper by the level of ”uncertaity” or ”risk”) effects the lending amount and the
probability of loan default, and hence effecting the net worth of these financial intermediaries.
And consequently, the endogenous net worth of the finanical intermediary sector could in fact
contribute aggregate movements in various financial and macro variables. Finally, we include
government in setting monetary policy rule with a variation of the Taylor Rule.
Here is a brief outline and summary of the environment of this economy: Figure 4.2 shows
a schematic of the implied flows for this economy.
• Three types of agents:
– Risk-averse patient (impatient) households that choose consumption, labor, money
holding, and housing service: Lend (borrow) money to (from) the financial interme-
diaries.
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Figure 4.2: Implied flows for the economy.
– Risk-neutral entrepreneurs (housing developers) that choose consumption, invest-
ment, and labor.
∗ Cost of inputs is financed by borrowing
∗ Housing production subject to risks shocks.
• Multisectors: 6 Firms
– Three intermediate goods producing: Construction, Manufacturing, and Service
– Two ”final” goods production: Residential Investment and Consumption / Non-
residential Investment
– Housing Production (via entrepreneurs): Residential Investment + Land.
• A mutual fund: Financial intermediaries (that guarantees a certain return to house-
holds through lending to an infinite number of entrepreneurs).
• Government: Lump sum money transfer and taxes.
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• Shocks: 6 different shocks
– 3 sectoral productivity technology shocks: Construction, Manufacturing and Service
– Idiosyncratic technology shocks (ωt ) affecting housing production.
∗ Denoting the c.d.f. and p.d.f. of ωt as Φ (ωt;σω,t) and φ (ωt;σω,t).
∗ Second moment, σω,t, (i.e. risk) shocks affecting the distribution of these Idiosyn-
cratic technology shocks.
– Monetary shocks: a´ la Taylor Rule.
– Housing demand (preference) shocks.
4.2.1 Money and cash-in-advance constraint in housing model: Households
This section follows the work of Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001) but adds loans and collateral
restrictions on the demand side as in Iacoviello and Neri (2010). Households maximize lifetime
utility given by:
E0
( ∞∑
t=0
βtU (ct, ht, 1−Nt)
)
(4.1)
w.r.t. its consumption ct, labor hours Nt, capital Kt and housing ht stocks, the investment into
consumption ik,t and housing ih,t goods sectors, and money holdings Mt subject to the budget
constraint (where we let λ to denote the Lagrange multiplier):
ct + ik,t + ph,tih,t +
Mt+1
Pc,t
≤ (4.2)
Kt (rt − τk (rt − δk)) +Ntwt (1− τn) + pl,txl,t+Mt +Ms,t
Pc,t
.
Pc,t denotes the nominal consumption price. Note that the new monetary injection, Ms,t is
distributed by the government at the beginning of the period as a lump-sum transfer (with
the aggregate money stock given by Ms,t). The cash-in-advance constraint (CIA) states that
money (post-transfer) must be used to buy investment and consumption goods (the associated
Lagrange multiplier is κ):
ct + ik,t + ph,tih,t ≤Mt +Ms,t
Pc,t
(4.3)
The laws of motion for capital and housing are given by (the respective Lagrange multipliers
are µ and ν):
Kt+1 = Fk (ik,t, ik,t−1) + (1− δk)Kt (4.4)
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ht+1 = Fh (ih,t, ih,t−1) + (1− δh)ht (4.5)
Here τk and τn are the capital income and labor income taxes correspondingly, δ represents the
usual capital/housing depreciation rate, pl,txl,t is the value of land, and the function Fj (ij,t, ij,t−1)
accounts investment adjustment cost. According to Christiano et. al (2005), Fj (ij,t, ij,t−1) =(
1− S
(
ij,t
ij,t−1
))
ij,t, where S(1) = S
′(1) = 0 and S′′(1) > 0.
The correspondent Euler equations are:
U1t − κt − λt = 0
wtλt − U3t = 0
µt = βEt ((1− δk)µt+1 + ((1− τk) rt+1 + τkδk)λt+1)
νt = βEt ((1− δh) νt+1 + U2t+1)
κt + λt = µtFc,1 (ik,t, ik,t−1) + βEt (µt+1Fc,2 (ik,t+1, ik,t))
ph, t (κt + λt) = νtFh,1 (ih, t, ih, t−1) + βEt (νt+1Fh,2 (ih, t+1, ih, t))
λt
Pc,t
= βEt
(
κt+1 + λt+1
Pc,t+1
)
Introducing the nominal interest rate Rt and the shadow prices of the capital and housing
good, qkt and qh,t respectively:
Rt = 1 +
κt
λt
, µt = qk,tU1,t, νt = qh,tU1,t
we obtain:
wt
Rt
=
U3t
U1t
(4.6)
qk,t = βEt
((
(1− δk) qk,t+1 + (1− τk) rt+1 + τkδk
Rt+1
)
U1,t+1
U1,t
)
(4.7)
qh,t = βEt
(
(1− δh) qh,t+1U1,t+1
U1,t
+
U2,t+1
U1,t
)
(4.8)
1 = qk,tFk,1 (ik, t, ik, t−1) + βEt
(
qk,t+1Fk,2 (ik, t+1, ik, t)
U1,t+1
U1,t
)
(4.9)
ph, t = qh,tFh,1 (ih, t, ih, t−1) + βEt
(
qh,t+1Fh,2 (ih, t+1, ih, t)
U1,t+1
U1,t
)
(4.10)
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including the Fisher equation for the nominal interest rate:
1 = βRtEt
(
U1,t+1
(1 + Πt+1)U1,t
)
(4.11)
where we introduce the inflation rate Πt,
Πt+1 =
Pc,t+1
Pc,t
− 1
The substitution of (4.3) into (4.2) and assuming that both constraints are binding, we have
our budget constraint as:
ct+1 + ik,t+1 + ph,t+1ih,t+1 = (4.12)
Kt ((1− τk) rt + τkδk) +Ntwt (1− τn) + pl,txl,t
1 + Πt+1
+
Ms,t+1
Pc,t+1
Utility function and demand shocks
The utility function is assumed to have the form:
U (c, h, l) =
(cµchµh l−µl)1−σ
1− σ (4.13)
where σ denotes the coefficient of relative risk aversion. The housing demand shock can be
added to the utility function assuming that the parameter µh follows the AR(1) processes:
lnµh,t+1 = (1− ρh) lnµ(0)h + ρh lnµh,t + εh,t+1 (4.14)
We use, in fact, the same utility function as Devis and Heathcote (2005), but slightly deviate
from them in notation (µl 6= 1− µc − µh,t) to avoid the influence of housing demand shocks on
the labor supply share µl.
Heterogeneous agents, borrowing and collateral constraint at the demand side
As in Iacoviello and Neri (2010), we now introduce two types of agents, patient and impatient. A
prime is used to denote impatient household’s parameters and variables (β′, N ′ etc.). The patient
households as described in the previous section have a discount factor that is larger than the
impatient ones, β > β′. While both groups may lend or borrow money, the assumption β > β′
will always lead to the situation where the patient households lend money to the impatient ones.
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Adding the borrowing bt to the patient household’s budget constraint (4.2) produce the
inequality (lending corresponds to the negative values of bt):
ct + ik,t + ph,tih,t+
bt−1Rb,t−1
1 + Πt
+
Mt+1
Pc,t
≤ (4.15)
Kt (rt − τk (rt − δk)) +Ntwt (1− τn) + pl,txl,t + bt+Mt +Ms,t
Pc,t
In addition to the budget constraint, households face a cash-in-advance constraint:
ct + ik,t + ph,tih,t ≤ Mt +Ms,t
Pc,t
(4.16)
so, the relation (4.12) is changed to the form:
ct+1 + ik,t+1 + ph,t+1ih,t+1 = (4.17)
Kt (rt − τk (rt − δk)) +Ntwt (1− τn) + pl,txl,t + bt − Rb,t−1bt−11+Πt
1 + Πt+1
+aMms,t+1
where ms,t =
(
Ms,t +M
′
s,t
)
/Pc,t. The share aM = Ms,t/
(
Ms,t +M
′
s,t
)
is chosen equal to its
steady-state value and remains constant.
The impatient households have shorter budget constraint, because they don’t own capital
and land, so the quantities proportional to Kt, ikt and xlt are omitted:
c′t + ph,ti
′
h,t+
Rb,t−1b′t−1
1 + Πt
+
M ′t+1
Pc,t
= N ′tw
′
t (1− τn) + b′t+
M ′t +M ′s,t
Pc,t
(4.18)
and their CIA constraint is:
c′t + ph,ti
′
h,t ≤
M ′t +M ′s,t
Pc,t
(4.19)
which leads to the combined constraint:
c′t+1 + ph,t+1i
′
h,t+1 =
N ′tw′t (1− τn) + b′t−Rb,t−1b
′
t−1
1+Πt
1 + Πt+1
+ (1− aM )ms,t+1 (4.20)
The additional (binding) borrowing constraint for the impatient households (collateral con-
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straint) restricts the size of the borrowed funds by the value of their housing stock:
b′t ≤ mEt
(
ph,t+1 (1 + Πt+1)h
′
t
Rt
)
(4.21)
where m denotes the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio. Iacoviello and Neri (2010) set m for the impa-
tient fraction of the USA households equal to m = 0.85. In our calibration exercise, we vary in
the range from 0.1 to 0.9 to analyse the effects of m on our economy; m = {0.1, 0.8, 0.85, 0.9} .
The market clearing condition for the borrowing is:
b′t + bt = 0 (4.22)
The housing stock growth equations for the patient and impatient householders are:
ht+1 + h
′
t+1 = Fh (ih, t, ih,t−1) + Fh
(
i′h, t, i
′
h,t−1
)
+ (1− δh)
(
ht + h
′
t
)
(4.23)
The patient households maximize their lifetime utility (4.1) w.r.t. consumption ct, labor
hours Nt, capital Kt and housing ht stocks, the investment into consumption ik,t and housing
ih,t goods sectors, money holdings Mt and borrowing bt subject to constraints (4.15) and (4.16),
stock accumulation equation (4.23) and the capital growth equation (4.4)
Their Euler equations consist of system (4.6) - (4.11) and the additional equation for the
borrowing interest rate rb,t:
1 = βRb,tEt
(
Rt
Rt+1
U1,t+1
(1 + Πt+1)U1,t
)
(4.24)
The impatient households maximize their lifetime utility (4.1) w.r.t. consumption c′t , labor
hours N ′t , housing h′t, the investment into housing goods sector i′h, t, money holdings M
′
t and
borrowing b′t subject to constraints (4.18), (4.19), collateral constraint (4.21) and the housing
accumulation equation (??). Their Euler equations are:
w′t
R′t
=
U3t
U1t
(4.25)
1 = β′R′tEt
(
U1,t+1
(1 + Πt+1)U1,t
)
(4.26)
q′b,tR
′
t = 1− β′Rb,tEt
(
R′t
R′t+1
U1,t+1
(1 + Πt+1)U1,t
)
(4.27)
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q′h,t = β
′Et
((
(1− δh) q′h,t+1 + q′b,t+1
b′t+1
h′t+1
)
U1,t+1
U1,t
+
U2,t+1
U1,t
)
(4.28)
ph, t = q
′
h,tFh,1
(
i′h, t, i
′
h,t−1
)
+ β′Et
(
q′h,t+1Fh,2
(
i′h, t+ 1, i
′
h,t
)U1,t+1
U1,t
)
(4.29)
Here q′b,t denotes the shadow price of borrowing. The utility function U = U (c
′
t, 1−N ′t , h′t) in
equations (4.25) - (4.29) depends on the impatient household’s consumption c′t, labor hours N ′t
and housing h′t.
4.2.2 Production (Firms): with only one household
We first assume a representative agent framework and then introduce heterogeneous agents as
described above. We assume (as in Davis and Heathcote (2005)) that final goods (residential
investment and consumption goods) are produced using intermediate goods. The intermediate
goods sector consists of three output: building/construction, manufacture, and services, which
are produced via Cobb-Douglas production functions:
xi = k
θi
i (e
zini)
1−θi (4.30)
where i = b,m, s (building/construction, manufacture, service), kit, nit and zit are capital, house-
hold -, entrepreneur labor, and labor augumenting (in log) productivity shock respectively for
each sector, with the θi being the share of capital that differ across sectors. For example, we let
in our calibration that θb < θm, reflecting the fact that the manufacturing sector is more capital
intensive (or less labor intensive) than the construction sector. Unlike Davis and Heathcote
(2005), we include entrepreneurial labor supply in the production function.9
The production shocks grows linearly:
zi = t ln gz,i + z˜i (4.31)
with the stochastic term ~z = (z˜b, z˜m, z˜s) following the vector AR(1) process:
~zt+1 = B · ~zt + ~εt+1 (4.32)
9Although we do not include in the model the entrepreneurial labor income, the assumption of entrepreneurial
labor income is necessary as it gurantees a nonzero net worth for each entrepreneur. This nonzero net worth
assumption is important as the financial contracting problem is not well defined otherwise. In our calibration
section, we let the share of entrepreneur’s labor supply to be quite small but nonzero. Consequently, although the
entreprenuers’ labor supply do not play a role in our equilibrium conditions, small share of entrepreneur’s labor
supply does ensure a small but nonzero net worth.
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where the the matrix B captures the deterministic part of shocks over time, and the innovation
vector ~ε is distributed normally with a given covariance matrix Σε. The shock growth factors
gz,i lead to the correspondent growth factors for other variables.
These intermediate firms maximize a conventional static profit function at t
max
{kit,nit}
{∑
i
pitxit − rtkt − wtnt
}
(4.33)
subject to equations kt ≥
∑
i kit, nt ≥
∑
i nit, and non-negativity of inputs, where rt, wt, and
pit are the capital rental, wage, and output prices. A conventional optimization leads to the
relations:
kir = θipixi (4.34)
niw = (1− θi) pixi (4.35)
so that
kir + niw = pixi (4.36)
The intermediate goods are then used as inputs to produce two final goods, yj :
yjt = Π
i=b,m,s
x1
ρij
ijt , (4.37)
where j = c, d (consumption/capital investment and residential investment respectively), the
input matrix is defined by
x1 =

bc bd
mc md
sc sd
 , (4.38)
and the shares of construction, manufactures and services for sector j are defined by the matrix
ρ =

Bc Bd
Mc Md
Sc Sd
 . (4.39)
The relative shares of the three intermediate inputs differ in producing two final goods. For
example, we would set Bc < Bd to represent the fact that the residential investment is more
construction input intensive. Moreover, with the CRS property of the production function, the
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following conditions must also be satisfied:
∑
i
ρij = 1 (4.40)
and
xit =
∑
j
x1ijt (4.41)
i.e
xbt = bct + bdt, xmt = mct +mdt, xst = sct + sdt. (4.42)
With intermediate goods as inputs, the final goods’ firms solve the following static profit
maximization problem at t where the price of consumption good, pct, is normalized to 1:
max
{bjt,mjt,sjt}
{
yct + pdtydt −
∑
i
pitxit
}
subject to equation (4.37) and non-negativity of inputs. The optimization of final good firms
leads to the relations:
pitx1i,jt = ρi,jpjtyjt (4.43)
where i = b,m, s, j = c, d
Due to CRS property, we obtain:
∑
i=b,m,s
pitxit =
∑
j=c,d
pjtyjt = Ktrt + wtNt (4.44)
where
Kt =
∑
i=b,m,s
kit, Nt =
∑
i=b,m,s
nit (4.45)
Lastly, the housing firms (real estate developers or entrepreneurs) produce the housing good,
yht, given residential investment ydt and fix amount of land xlt as inputs, according to
yht = x
φ
lty
1−φ
dt (4.46)
where, φ denotes the share of land. Output equation (4.46) will be modified later in the section
to include idiosyncratic productivity and uncertainty shocks. As mentioned in the introduction,
the focus of our paper is on the housing sector in which agency costs with uncertainty and
hetroegeneity arise: we come back to this modification on the firms’ behaviorin the later section.
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The optimization defines the price relations:
plxl = φphyh, pdyd = (1− φ)phyh (4.47)
Firms: Production side with two types of households
With both patient and impatient household, we now need to make small modifications of the
production side of the model due to the presence of two types of labor supplying households in
the system. Now the production of the intermediate good (4.30) changes to the form10:
xi = k
θi
i
(
ezinai n
′1−α
i
)
1−θi (4.48)
where ni and n
′
i are the hours supplied by the patient and impatient households respectively
accordingly to their labor share α. Equations (4.35) and (4.36) now are:
niw = αpixi (1− θi) (4.49)
n′iw
′ = (1− α)pixi (1− θi) (4.50)
and
kir + n
′
iw
′ + niw = pixi. (4.51)
Balance equations (4.44) are also changed to:
∑
i=b,m,s
pixi =
∑
j=c,d
pjyj = Kr +Nw +N
′w′. (4.52)
The new variable N ′ denotes the total impatient household’s hours:
N ′ =
∑
i=b,m,s
n′i. (4.53)
We can introduce now the effective hours L and the effective wage W :
L = NαN ′1−α, W =
(w
α
)α( w′
1− α
)1−α
. (4.54)
10For the simplicity purpose, we drop the time script in this section.
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Then from relation (4.49) and (4.50) follows that
LW = Nw +N ′w′. (4.55)
We can also introduce the effective hours li = n
α
i n
′1−α
i for building, manufacture and services
(i = b,m, s) separately:
li = n
α
i n
′1−α
i .
Then the following equations hold:
liW = (1− θi) pixi = n′iw′ + niw, L =
∑
i=b,m,s
li
4.2.3 Credit Channel with Uncertainty
In this section, we outline how the financial intermediaries decide on the amount of loan that is to
be lend out to housing developers (entrepreneurs). One should note that in our lending model,
we only focuses on the supply side. That is, we do not address the endogenous lending mechanism
for the impatient households (the demand side): The loan for the impatient household is
exogenously determined by the collateral constraint in equation (4.21).
Housing Entrepreneurial Contract
It is assumed that a continuum of housing producing firms with unit mass are owned by risk-
neutral entrepreneurs (developers). The costs of producing housing are financed via loans from
risk-neutral intermediaries. Given the realization of the idiosyncratic shock to housing produc-
tion, some real estate developers will not be able to satisfy their loan payments and will go
bankrupt. The banks take over operations of these bankrupt firms but must pay an agency fee.
These agency fees, therefore, affect the aggregate production of housing and, as shown below,
imply an endogenous markup to housing prices. That is, since some housing output is lost to
agency costs, the price of housing must be increased in order to cover factor costs.
The timing of events is critical:
1. The exogenous state vector of technology shocks, uncertainty shocks, housing preference
shocks, and monetary shocks, denoted (zi,t, σω,t, µh,t+1, Rt+1), is realized.
2. Firms hire inputs of labor and capital from households and entrepreneurs and produce
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intermediate output via Cobb-Douglas production functions. These intermediate goods
are then used to produce the two final outputs.
3. Households make their labor, consumption, housing, and investment decisions.
4. With the savings resources from households, the banking sector provide loans to en-
trepreneurs via the optimal financial contract (described below). The contract is defined
by the size of the loan (fpat) and a cutoff level of productivity for the entrepreneurs’
technology shock, ω¯t.
5. Entrepreneurs use their net worth and loans from the banking sector in order to purchase
the factors for housing production. The quantity of factors (residential investment and
land) is determined and paid for before the idiosyncratic technology shock is known.
6. The idiosyncratic technology shock of each entrepreneur is realized. If ωat ≥ ω¯t the
entrepreneur is solvent and the loan from the bank is repaid; otherwise the entrepreneur
declares bankruptcy and production is monitored by the bank at a cost proportional (but
time varying) to total factor payments.
7. Solvent entrepreneur’s sell their remaining housing output to the bank sector and use this
income to purchase current consumption and capital. The latter will in part determine
their net worth in the following period.
8. Note that the total amount of housing output available to the households is due to three
sources: (1) The repayment of loans by solvent entrepreneurs, (2) The housing output
net of agency costs by insolvent firms, and (3) the sale of housing output by solvent
entrepreneurs used to finance the purchase of consumption and capital.
For entrepreneur a, the housing production function is denoted G (xalt, yadt) and is assumed
to exhibit constant returns to scale. Specifically, we assume:
yaht = ωatG (xalt, yadt) = ωatx
ζ
alty
1−ζ
adt (4.56)
where, ζ denotes the share of land. It is assumed that the aggregate quantity of land is fixed and
equal to 1. The technology shock, ωat, is an idiosyncratic shock affecting real estate developers.
The technology shock is assumed to have a unitary mean and standard deviation of σω,t. The
standard deviation, σω,t, follows an AR (1) process:
σω,t+1 = σ
1−χ
0 σ
χ
ω,t exp
εσ,t+1 (4.57)
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with the steady-state value σ0, χ ∈ (0, 1) and εσ,t+1 is a white noise innovation.11
Each period, entrepreneurs enter the period with net worth given by nwat. Developers use
this net worth and loans from the banking sector in order to purchase inputs. Letting fpat
denote the factor payments associated with developer a, we have:
fpat = pdtyadt + pltxalt (4.58)
Hence, the size of the loan is (fpat − nwat) . The realization of ωat is privately observed by each
entrepreneur; banks can observe the realization at a cost that is proportional to the total input
bill.
It is convenient to express these agency costs in terms of the price of housing. Note that
agency costs combined with constant returns to scale in housing production (see eq. (4.56))
implies that the aggregate value of housing output must be greater than the value of inputs; i.e.
housing must sell at a markup over the input costs, the factor payments. Denote this markup
as s¯t (which is treated as parametric by both lenders and borrowers) which satisfies:
phtyht = s¯tfpt (4.59)
Also, since E (ωt) = 1 and all firms face the same factor prices, this implies that, at the individual
level, we have12
phtG (xalt, yadt) = s¯tfpat (4.60)
Given these relationships, we define agency costs for loans to an individual entrepreneur in terms
of foregone housing production as µs¯tfpat.
With a positive net worth, the entrepreneur borrows (fpat − nwat) consumption goods and
agrees to pay back
(
1 + rLt
)
(fpat − nwat) to the lender, where rLt is the interest rate on loans.
The cutoff value of productivity, ω¯t, that determines solvency (i.e. ωat ≥ ω¯t) or bankruptcy
(i.e. ωat < ω¯t) is defined by
(
1 + rLt
)
(fpat − nwat) = phtω¯tF (·) (where F (·) = F (xalt, yadt)).
Denoting the c.d.f. and p.d.f. of ωt as Φ (ωt;σω,t) and φ (ωt;σω,t), the expected returns to a
11This autoregressive process is used so that, when the model is log- linearized, σˆω,t (defined as the percentage
deviations from σ0) follows a standard, mean-zero AR(1) process.
12The implication is that, at the individual level, the product of the markup (s¯t) and factor payments is equal
to the expected value of housing production since housing output is unknown at the time of the contract. Since
there is no aggregate risk in housing production, we also have phtyht = s¯tfpt.
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housing producer is therefore given by:13
∫ ∞
ω¯t
[
phtωF (·)−
(
1 + rLt
)
(fpat − nwat)
]
φ (ω;σω,t) dω (4.61)
Using the definition of ω¯t and eq. (4.60), this can be written as:
s¯tfpatf (ω¯t;σω,t) (4.62)
where f (ω¯t;σω,t) is defined as:
f (ω¯t;σω,t) =
∫ ∞
ω¯t
ωφ (ω;σω,t) dω − [1− Φ (ω¯t;σω,t)] ω¯t (4.63)
Similarly, the expected returns to lenders is given by:
∫ ω¯t
0
phtωF (·)φ (ω;σω,t) dω + [1− Φ (ω¯t;σω,t)]
(
1 + rLt
)
(fpat − nwat)− Φ (ω¯t;σω,t)µs¯tfpat
(4.64)
Again, using the definition of ω¯t and eq. (4.60), this can be expressed as:
s¯tfpatg (ω¯t;σω,t) (4.65)
where g (ω¯t;σω,t) is defined as:
g (ω¯t;σω,t) =
∫ ω¯t
0
ωφ (ω;σω,t) dω + [1− Φ (ω¯t;σω,t)] ω¯t − Φ (ω¯t;σω,t)µ (4.66)
Note that these two functions sum to:
f (ω¯t;σω,t) + g (ω¯t;σω,t) = 1− Φ (ω¯t;σω,t)µ (4.67)
Hence, the term Φ (ω¯t;σω,t)µ captures the loss of housing due to the agency costs associated
with bankruptcy. With the expected returns to lender and borrower expressed in terms of the
size of the loan, fpat, and the cutoff value of productivity, ω¯t, it is possible to define the optimal
borrowing contract by the pair (fpat, ω¯t) that maximizes the entrepreneur’s return subject to
the lender’s willingness to participate (all rents go to the entrepreneur). That is, the optimal
contract is determined by the solution to:
13The notation Φ (ω;σω,t) is used to denote that the distribution function is time-varying as determined by the
realization of the random variable, σω,t.
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max
ω¯t,fpat
s¯tfpatf (ω¯t;σω,t) subject to s¯tfpatg (ω¯t;σω,t) > fpat − nwat (4.68)
A necessary condition for the optimal contract problem is given by:
∂ (.)
∂ω¯t
: s¯tfpat
∂f (ω¯t;σω,t)
∂ω¯t
= −λts¯tfpat∂g (ω¯t;σω,t)
∂ω¯t
(4.69)
where λt is the shadow price of the lender’s resources. Using the definitions of f (ω¯t;σω,t) and
g (ω¯t;σω,t), this can be rewritten as:
14
1− 1
λt
=
φ (ω¯t;σω,t)
1− Φ (ω¯t;σω,t)µ (4.70)
As shown by eq.(4.70), the shadow price of the resources used in lending is an increasing func-
tion of the relevant Inverse Mill’s ratio (interpreted as the conditional probability of bankruptcy)
and the agency costs. If the product of these terms equals zero, then the shadow price equals
the cost of housing production, i.e. λt = 1.
The second necessary condition is:
∂ (.)
∂fpat
: s¯tf (ω¯t;σω,t) = λt [1− s¯tg (ω¯t;σω,t)] (4.71)
These first-order conditions imply that, in general equilibrium, the markup factor, s¯t, will
be endogenously determined and related to the probability of bankruptcy. Specifically, using
the first order conditions, we have that the markup, s¯t, must satisfy:
s¯−1t =
[
(f (ω¯t;σω,t) + g (ω¯t;σω,t)) +
φ (ω¯t;σω,t)µf (ω¯t;σω,t)
∂f(ω¯t;σω,t)
∂ω¯t
]
(4.72)
=
1− Φ (ω¯t;σω,t)µ︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
− φ (ω¯t;σω,t)
1− Φ (ω¯t;σω,t)µf (ω¯t;σω,t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
B

which then can be written as
st =
1
1− µΦ ($t) + µf ($t) ϕ($t)f ′($t)
(4.73)
We make some brief remarks on the markup equation above. First note that the markup factor
14Note that we have used the fact that
∂f(ω¯t;σω,t)
∂ω¯t
= Φ (ω¯t;σω,t) − 1 < 0
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depends only on economy-wide variables so that the aggregate markup factor is well defined.
Also, the two terms, A and B, demonstrate that the markup factor is affected by both the
total agency costs (term A) and the marginal effect that bankruptcy has on the entrepreneur’s
expected return. That is, term B reflects the loss of housing output, µ, weighted by the expected
share that would go to entrepreneur’s, f (ω¯t;σω,t) , and the conditional probability of bankruptcy
(the Inverse Mill’s ratio). Finally, note that, in the absence of credit market frictions, there is
no markup so that s¯t = 1. In the partial equilibrium setting, it is straightforward to show that
equation (4.72) defines an implicit function ω¯ (s¯t, σω,t) that is increasing in s¯t.
The incentive compatibility constraint implies
fpat =
1
(1− s¯tg (ω¯t;σω,t))nwat (4.74)
Equation (4.74) implies that the size of the loan is linear in entrepreneur’s net worth so that
aggregate lending is well-defined and a function of aggregate net worth.
The effect of an increase in uncertainty on lending can be understood in a partial equilibrium
setting where s¯t and nwat are treated as parameters. As shown by eq. (4.72), the assumption
that the markup factor is unchanged implies that the costs of default, represented by the terms
A and B, must be constant. With a mean-preserving spread in the distribution for ωt, this
means that ω¯t will fall (this is driven primarily by the term A). Through an approximation
analysis, it can be shown that ω¯t ≈ g (ω¯t;σω,t) (see the Appendix in Dorofeenko, Lee, and Salyer
(2008)). That is, the increase in uncertainty will reduce lenders’ expected return (g (ω¯t;σω,t)).
Rewriting the binding incentive compatibility constraint (eq. (4.74)) yields:
s¯tg (ω¯t;σω,t) = 1− nwat
fpat
(4.75)
the fall in the left-hand side induces a fall in fpat. Hence, greater uncertainty results in a fall
in housing production. This partial equilibrium result carries over to the general equilibrium
setting.
The existence of the markup factor implies that inputs will be paid less than their marginal
products. In particular, profit maximization in the housing development sector implies the
following necessary conditions:
plt
pht
=
Gxl (xlt, ydt)
s¯t
(4.76)
pdt
pht
=
Gyd (xlt, ydt)
s¯t
(4.77)
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These expressions demonstrate that, in equilibrium, the endogenous markup (determined by the
agency costs) will be a determinant of housing prices.
The production of new housing is determined by a Cobb-Douglas production with residential
investment and land (fixed in equilibrium) as inputs. Denoting housing output, net of agency
costs, as yht, this is given by:
yht = x
ζ
lty
1−ζ
dt [1− Φ (ω¯t;σω,t)µ] (4.78)
In equilibrium, we require that iht = yht; i.e. household’s housing investment is equal to housing
output. Recall that the law of motion for housing is given by eq. (4.5)
Entrepreneurial Consumption and House Prices
To rule out self-financing by the entrepreneur (i.e. which would eliminate the presence of agency
costs), it is assumed that the entrepreneur discounts the future at a faster rate than the patient
household. This is represented by following expected utility function:
E0
∑∞
t=0 (βηγ)
t cet (4.79)
where cet denotes entrepreneur’s per-capita consumption at date t, and γ ∈ (0, 1) . This new
parameter, γ, will be chosen so that it offsets the steady-state internal rate of return due to
housing production.
Each period, entrepreneur’s net worth, nwt is determined by the value of capital income and
the remaining capital stock.15 That is, entrepreneurs use capital to transfer wealth over time
(recall that the housing stock is owned by households). Denoting entrepreneur’s capital as ket ,
this implies:16
nwt = k
e
t [rt + 1− δκ] (4.80)
The law of motion for entrepreneurial capital stock is determined in two steps. First, new
capital is financed by the entrepreneurs’ value of housing output after subtracting consumption:
ηket+1 = phtyahtf (ω¯t;σω,t)− cet = s¯tfpatf (ω¯t;σω,t)− cet (4.81)
15As stated in footnote 6, net worth is also a function of current labor income so that net worth is bounded
above zero in the case of bankruptcy. However, since entrepreneur’s labor share is set to a very small number, we
ignore this component of net worth in the exposition of the model.
16For expositional purposes, in this section we drop the subscript a denoting the individual entrepreneur.
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Note we have used the equilibrium condition that phtyaht = s¯tfpat to introduce the markup,
s¯t, into the expression. Then, using the incentive compatibility constraint, eq. (4.74), and the
definition of net worth, the law of motion for capital is given by:
ηket+1 = k
e
t (rt + 1− δκ)
s¯tf (ω¯t;σω,t)
1− s¯tg (ω¯t;σω,t) − c
e
t (4.82)
The term s¯tf (ω¯t;σω,t) / (1− s¯tg (ω¯t;σω,t)) represents the entrepreneur’s internal rate of return
due to housing production; alternatively, it reflects the leverage enjoyed by the entrepreneur
since
s¯tf (ω¯t;σω,t)
1− s¯tg (ω¯t;σω,t) =
s¯tfpatf (ω¯t;σω,t)
nwt
(4.83)
That is, entrepreneurs use their net worth to finance factor inputs of value fpat, this produces
housing which sells at the markup s¯t with entrepreneur’s retaining fraction f (ω¯t;σω,t) of the
value of housing output.
Given this setting, the optimal path of entrepreneurial consumption implies the following
Euler equation:
1 = βηγEt
[
(rt+1 + 1− δκ) s¯t+1 f (ω¯t+1;σω,t+1)
1− s¯t+1g (ω¯t+1;σω,t+1)
]
(4.84)
Finally, we can derive an explicit relationship between entrepreneur’s capital and the value
of the housing stock using the incentive compatibility constraint and the fact that housing sells
at a markup over the value of factor inputs. That is, since phtF (xalt, yadt) = s¯tfpt, the incentive
compatibility constraint implies:
pht
(
xζlty
1−ζ
dt
)
= ket
(rt + 1− δκ)
1− s¯tg (ω¯t;σω,t) s¯t (4.85)
Again, it is important to note that the markup parameter plays a key role in determining housing
prices and output.
Financial Intermediaries
The Capital Mutual Funds (CMFs) act as risk-neutral financial intermediaries who earn no
profit and produce neither consumption nor capital goods. There is a clear role for the CMF in
this economy since, through pooling, all aggregate uncertainty of capital (house) production can
be eliminated. The CMF receives capital from three sources: entrepreneurs sell undepreciated
capital in advance of the loan, after the loan, the CMF receives the newly created capital through
loan repayment and through monitoring of insolvent firms, and, finally, those entrepreneur’s that
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are still solvent, sell some of their capital to the CMF to finance current period consumption.
This capital is then sold at the price of s¯t units of consumption to households for their investment
plans.
4.2.4 Government budget constraint
Assuming the absence of government money holdings, its budget constraint equation is:
Gt + µΦ ($t) ph,tyh,t +ms,t+m
′
s,t = (4.86)
Kt (rt − δk) τk+
(
Ntwt +N
′
tw
′
t
)
τn+m
G
t
where Gt denotes the real government spending, ms,t= Mst/Pc,t,m
′
s,t = M
′
t/Pc,t, and m
G
t =
MGt /Pc,t and M
G
t is a lump-sum money injection into the whole economy. Here we let the
money evolves according to
mGt+1 = (1− ρM )mG0 + ρMmGt
where, ρM ∈ (0, 1).
Following Christiano, Eichenbaum and Trabandt (2014), we use the monetary policy rule as:
log
(
Rb,t+1
Rb
)
= %R log
(
Rb,t
Rb
)
+
(1− %R)
(
%pi log
(
1 + Πt+1
1 + Π
)
+ %gdp log
(
GDPt+1
GDP
)
+ %∆gdp log
(
GDPt+1
GDPt
))
+ εR,t+1
(4.87)
We also use one-period log-difference for GDP instead of averaged four-period difference used
by Christiano et al, (2014).17
We assume here that the monitoring of defaulting firms is arranged by a government’s insti-
tution, but separate the monitoring cost µΦ ($t) ph,tyh,t from the other government spendings
as each deafulting firms belong to different industries (see eqs (4.89) and (4.90) below). The
share of government spendings Gt/GDPt = aG is considered to be a fixed value according to
Davis and Heathcote (2005) (see eq (4.91)). The government distributes money injections Mst
and M ′st between the patient and impatient householders proportionally to their steady-state
shares M0 and M
′
0.
17Equation (4.87) contains variables with exponential trend removed. The variables without subscript denote
steady-state values. We use “borrowing interest rate” of borrowing between patient and impatient households,
Rb , in eq (4.87) as one of the targeted values.
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The complete system of 62 equilibrium equations of the model is summarized in the Ap-
pendix.
4.3 Empirical Results
Our primary empirical objective in this paper is to show the importance of the following key
parameters (variables) and shocks on housing variables as well as some of the aggregate macro
variables. Consequently, we do not calibrate our model to specific country’s economic parame-
ters, but rather we set the model parameters to our benchmark values of the U.S. economy but
with the loan-to-value (m) to to vary to reflect different european countries situation. Most of
the parameters are based on three sources: Davis and Healthcote (2004), Iacoviello and Neri
(2010) and Dorofeenko, Lee and Salyer (2014). Some of the other key parameters that need
further explanation are described below. In this section, we do not address some of the housing
and business cycles: we do discuss in this paper version, the steady-state, and some of the second
moment properties of the model to the data. We, however, focus our results on the dynamics of
the model by analyzing impulse response functions and variance decompositions.
4.3.1 Calibration Parameters
We use linear approximation approach to calibrate our model. As mentioned above, we employ
our parameters based on the U.S. and various European nations (average values) dataset. We
do not claim that the parameters that we employ in this section reflect the true nature of the
European economies that we have in mind. For example, the bankrupcy rates across different
nations vary as each economy has a different set of bankruptcy laws and rules. Nevertheless,
during our calibration excercise, we have checked the robustness of several of the paramameter
that we thought would lead to an unstable equilibrium case. The parameters that we have finally
decided to use do not change much of the empirical results that we are to report in the next
section. The crucial parameter that we use to distinguish three different European economies
of Germany, Italy, and Spain, we assign the LTV ratio, m, {0.80; 0.85; 0.90} 18 respectively.
A strong motivation for using the Davis and Heathcote (2005) model is that the theoretical
constructs have empirical counterparts. Hence, the model parameters can be calibrated to
18We also include the LTV of 0.1 (m = 0.1) to reflect almost no LTV constraint.
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Table 4.1: Key Preference, Lending and Production Parameters.
Notation Value Description
br 0.039 Bankruptcy rate
m0 0.00868 steady state value of money supply
rp 0.0187 risk premium
a 0.9 patient HH’s labor share
b 0.93 impatient HH’s discount rate
β 0.951 patient household discount factor
γ 0.825 extra entrepr discount factor
η 1.017 population growth rate
Π0 0.02 inflation rate
σ0 0.231 st.dev.of entrepreneurial ω
φ 0.106 land share in housing production
χ 0.001 persistency of σ
ω0 0.648 steady-state.of ω
aG 0.01 gorevnment consump.share of GDP
δk 0.0557 capital depreciation rate
δs 0.0157 res. structure depreciation rate
δh 0.014 housing stock depreciation rate
θb 0.106 construction capital share
θm 0.33 manufacturing capital share
θs 0.248 services capital share
κh 3 housing investment adjustment cost
κk 3 capital investment adjustment cost
µc 0.314 cons.easticity in utility function
µh 0.0444 housing easticity in utility function
µ` 0.642 leisure easticity in utility function
µh 0.25 monitoring cost
%gdp 0.012 TR persistency of GDP
%pi 1.672 TR persistency of inflation
%R 0.792 TR persistency of interest rate
%∆gdp 0.184 TR persistency of GDP change
%h 0.96 persistency of housing demand shock
%m 0.9 persistency of money
gz,b 0.997 construction productivity growth rate
gz,m 1.028 manufacturing productivity growth rate
gz,s 1.016 services productivity growth rate
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Table 4.2: Intermediate Production Technology Parameters.
B M S
Input shares for consumption/investment good (Bc,Mc, Sc) 0.031 0.270 0.700
Input shares for residential investment (Bd,Md, Sd) 0.470 0.238 0.292
Capital’s share in each sector (θb, θm, θs) 0.132 0.309 0.237
Sectoral trend productivity growth (%) (gzb, gzm, gzs) -0.27 2.85 1.65
the data. We use directly the parameter values chosen by the previous authors; readers are
directed to their paper for an explanation of their calibration methodology. Parameter values
for preferences, depreciation rates, population growth and land’s share are presented in Table
4.1. In addition, the parameters for the intermediate production technologies are presented in
Table 4.2.19
As in Davis and Heathcote (2005), the exogenous shocks to productivity in the three sectors
are assumed to follow an autoregressive process as given in eq. (??). The parameters for the
vector autoregression are the same as used in Davis and Heathcote (2005) (see their Table 4, p.
766 for details). In particular, we use the following values (recall that the rows of the B matrix
correspond to the building, manufacturing, and services sectors, respectively):
B =

0.707 0.010 −0.093
−0.006 0.871 −0.150
0003 0.028 0.919

Note this implies that productivity shocks have modest dynamic effects across sectors. The
contemporaneous correlations of the innovations to the shock are given by the correlation matrix:
Σ =

Corr (εb, εb) Corr (εb, εm) Corr (εb, εs)
Corr (εm, εm) Corr (εm, εs)
Corr (εs, εs)
 =

1 0.089 0.306
1 0.578
1

The standard deviations for the innovations were assumed to be: (σbb, σmm, σss) = (0.041, 0.036,
0.018).
19Davis and Heathcote (2005) determine the input shares into the consumption and residential investment good
by analyzing the two sub-tables contained in the “Use” table of the 1992 Benchmark NIPA Input-Output tables.
Again, the interested reader is directed to their paper for further clarification.
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For the financial sector, we use the same loan and bankruptcy rates as in Carlstrom and
Fuerst (1997) in order to calibrate the steady-state value of ω¯t, denoted $, and the steady-state
standard deviation of the entrepreneur’s technology shock, σ0. The average spread between the
prime and commercial paper rates is used to define the average risk premium (rp) associated with
loans to entrepreneurs as defined in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997); this average spread is 1.87%
(expressed as an annual yield). The steady-state bankruptcy rate (br) is given by Φ ($,σ0) and
Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) used the value of 3.9% (again, expressed as an annual rate). This
yields two equations which determine ($,σ0):
20
Φ ($,σ0) = 3.90
$
g ($,σ0)
− 1 = 1.87 (4.88)
yielding $ ≈ 0.65, σ0 ≈ 0.23.21
The entrepreneurial discount factor γ can be recovered by the condition that the steady-state
internal rate of return to the entrepreneur is offset by their additional discount factor:
γ
[
s¯f ($,σ0)
1− s¯g ($,σ0)
]
= 1
and using the mark-up equation for s¯ in eq. (4.72), the parameter γ then satisfies the relation
γ =
gU
gK
[
1 +
φ ($,σ0)
f ′ ($,σ0)
]
≈ 0.832
where, gU is the growth rate of marginal utility and gK is the growth rate of consumption
(identical to the growth rate of capital on a balanced growth path). The autoregressive parameter
for the risk shocks, χ, is set to 0.90 so that the persistence is roughly the same as that of the
productivity shocks.
The final two parameters are the adjustment cost parameters (κk, κh) . In their analysis of
quarterly U.S. business cycle data, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) provide estimates
of κk for different variants of their model which range over the interval (0.91, 3.24) (their model
did not include housing and so there was no estimate for κh). Since our empirical analysis
involves annual data, we choose a lower value for the adjustment cost parameter and, moreover,
20Note that the risk premium can be derived from the markup share of the realized output and the amount of
payment on borrowing: s¯tω¯tfpt = (1 + rp) (fpt − nwt) . And using the optimal factor payment (project invest-
ment), fpt, in equation (4.74), we arrive at the risk premium in equation (4.88).
21It is worth noting that, using financial data, Gilchrist et al. (2008) estimate σ0 to be equal to 0.36. Moreover,
Chugh (2016) using industry level data estimates σ0 to be exactly 0.23.
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we impose the restriction that κk = κh. We assume that κh = κh = 3 implying that the (short-
run) elasticity of investment and housing with respect to a change in the respective shadow prices
is 0.33 (i.e. the inverse of the adjustment cost parameter). Given the estimates in Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), we think that these values are certainly not extreme. We also
solve the model with no adjustment costs. As discussed below, the presence of adjustment costs
improves the behavior of the model in several dimensions.
Estimation of Risk Shocks
In this section, we estimate risk shocks using the U.S. construction firm level data. The main
purpose in estimating these shocks is to show that risk shocks defined as the time variation in the
cross sectional distribution of firm level productivities are important inputs to a baseline DSGE
model. In estimating risk shocks, we use the dataset from the Compustat Industry Specific
Quarterly data. For the robustness of our estimation, we estimate for 2 intersecting subsets of
firms: i). The firms with S&P GIC sub-industry code 25201030 – Homebuilding (47 firms); ii).
The firms with NAICS sub-industry code 23611 (sub-industries 236115-236118) - Residential
Building Construction (35 firms)22.
The procedure we employ in estimating our risk shocks is similar to Chugh (2011), who
uses the dataset of Cooper and Haltiwanger’s (2006) U.S. manufacturing dataset. In order
to estimate the risk shocks, we first need to estimate the firm-level productivity coefficients
via Fama-MacBeth regression as follows: employing the usual Cobb-Douglas production Bit =
cmαitl
1−α
it exp (εit) , where i and t denote firm and time , Bit is the Backlogs, i.e., the “dollar
value of housing units subject to pending sales contracts” to proxy output, lit is “Land under
development”, mit is defined as “Homebuilding inventories Total” - “Land under development”
- “Undeveloped inventories owned” and εit iid with Normal. Taking the log of the production
function, we estimate following regression:
log
(
Bit
lit
)
= c+ α log
(
mit
lit
)
+ εit
Given the dataset, the term Bitlit represents the ”profit or productivity” and the term
mit
lit
denotes the input. The estimates of α for subset (1) and subset (2) are α1 = 0.6 (0.05) and
α2 = 0.7 (0.04) respectively with the standard deviations in brackets. With the estimates α̂, the
22The full description of these NAICS codes are as follows: 23611 Residential Building Construction, 236115 New
Single-Family Housing Construction (except Operative Builders), 236116 New Multifamily Housing Construction
(except Operative Builders), 236117 New Housing Operative Builders, and 236118 Residential Remodelers.
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logarithmic productivity is then defined as the residual:
log (Pit) = log
(
Bit
lit
)
− α̂ log
(
mit
lit
)
where, the aggregate productivity is defined as Pt ≡ 1N
Nt∑
i=1
Pit and idiosyncratic productivity
as pit ≡ PitPt (with 1Nt
Nt∑
i=1
pit = 1). Consequently, the risk is estimated as cross-sectional standard
deviation of pit : that is,
σt =
√√√√ 1
N
Nt∑
i=1
(pit − 1)2 .
Finally, the AR(1) estimates of HP-detrended risk σt, log (σt) = ρ log (σt−1) + εt where εt ∼
N
(
0, σ2σ
)
, that we use as our input to our model yield i) for the subset 1, ρ = 0.28(0.17) and
σσ = 0.23(0.02); and ii) for the subset 2, ρ = 0.26(0.19) and σσ = 0.24(0.03), where the numbers
in brackets indicate the standard deviations. Moreover, the corresponding annual value for
ρy ≈ 0.02 and σyσ ≈ 0.01.
Figure 4.3: Estimated productivity and risk shocks from 2001 until 2011.
Figure 4.3 shows the estimated productivity and risk shocks from 2001 till 2011. The HP
trends for productivity and risk shocks clearly show that the shocks behave opposite: one can
think of risk (uncertainty) shocks as ”negative” technology shocks in terms of the role the shocks
play in our model. These strongly countercyclical construction firm level risk is also a robust
finding in micro evidence of Bachmann and Bayer (2010) and Bloom, Floetotto, and Jaimovich
(2010).
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4.3.2 Dynamics
Loan-to-Value Effect and Various Shocks: Impulse Response Functions
The main questions to be addressed in this sections are as follows: i) How do non-standard
shocks in relation to the technology shocks effect key housing and macroeconomic variables? ii)
How does the collateral constraint on some of the households effect the housing and business
cycles?
Figures 4.4 through 4.9 show the impulse response functions (to a 1% innovation in all four
shocks) for several macroeconomic and housing variables under one key parameter value23: the
LTV ratio, which is set to either 0.1 or 0.85. A few papers have investigated the role of col-
lateral requirements for the transmission of unanticipated shocks and macroeconomic volatility.
Campbell and Hercowitz (2004) find that the U.S. mortgage market liberalization of the early
1990s, proxied by an increase in the LTV ratio, played a role in explaining the great moderation.
In contrast, Calza, Monacelli and Stracca (2013) show that the transmission of monetary policy
shocks to consumption, investment and house prices is dampened by lower LTV ratio. While
the results discussed above provide some support for the housing cum credit channel model, the
role of the lending channel with collateral constraint is not easily seen because of the presence
of the other impulse shocks (i.e., the sectoral productivity shocks).
We first turn to the behavior of three key macroeconomic variables, namely GDP, household
consumption (denoted PCE), and total capital when the LTV is set to 10% (m=0.1) and 85%
(m=0.85) as seen in Figures 4.4 and 4.5. The response to a technology shock to the construction
sector has the predicted effect that GDP increases. Consumption also increases, while capital
stock responds much bigger. This consumption/savings decision reflects agents response to the
expected high productivity (due to the persistence of the shock) in the construction sector.
Turning to a risk shock which affects housing production results, we see a modest fall in GDP
and in capital stock. Recall, as discussed in the partial equilibrium analysis of the credit channel
model, an increase in productivity risk results in a leftward shift in the supply of housing; since
residential investment (and hence, the capital stock) is the primary input into housing, it too
falls in response to the increased risk. Moreover, changes in uncertainty increases the bankruptcy
rate and hence an increase in the agency costs, causing the rate of return on investment to de-
crease: consequently, resulting in a reduction in investment. Consumption reacts negatively to
23We also have analysed two other parameter dimensions: the monitoring cost (reflecting the agency cost) and
capital adjustment cost (reflecting the amplitude of business cycles). The results are not shown as we focus on
the effects of the LTV parameter.
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Figure 4.4: Impulse response of GDP, Total Capital and Consumption (PCE) to a 1% increase in
Uncertainty Shocks, Preference Shocks, Sector (Construction) Technology Shocks, and Monetary
Shocks: LTV = 0.1 (m=0.1).
Note: The vertical axis is measured as percentage deviation from steady-state values.
a risk shock due to an increase in ”pre-cautionary savings” as households face the persistence
of the shock. Consumption responds positively to monetary shocks, which is consistent with
models that have an investment specific technology shock (e.g. Greenwood, Hercowitz, and
Krusell (2000)). An increase in consumption due to monetary shocks also translates into an
increase in both GDP and capital stocks. The monetary shocks play a large role in the afore-
mentioned variables: the magnitude of the monetary shock is as big as the technology shocks
if not bigger. An increase in preference shocks for housing reflects in a decrease in cosumption,
and consquently, leading to a decrease in both GDP and capital stocks. Figure 4.5 shows the
effects of the aforementioned shocks and three macroeconomic variables for the LTV ratio of
85%. The results are similar both in magnitude and qualitatively to the case where the LTV
ratio is set to 10%. The similar results between 10% and 85% of LTV ratios indicate that the
collateral constraint equation is binding and the LTV ratio plays almost no role for the key
macreconomic variables mentioned above.
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Figure 4.5: Impulse response of GDP, Total Capital and Consumption (PCE) to a 1% increase in
Uncertainty Shocks, Preference Shocks, Sector (Construction) Technology Shocks, and Monetary
Shocks: LTV = 0.85 (m=0.85).
Note: The vertical axis is measured as percentage deviation from steady-state values.
Figures 4.6 and 4.7 report the impulse response functions of the housing markup, the risk
premium on loans to the housing producers and the bankruptcy rate. As mentioned in previous
paragraph, as the role of LTV is negligible, we only discuss the scenarios for the 10% LTV. A
positive technology shock to the construction sector increases the demand for housing and, ceteris
paribus, will result in an increase in the price of housing. This will result in greater lending to
the housing producers which will result in a greater bankruptcy rate and risk premium; both of
these effects imply that the housing markup will increase. Note the counterfactual implication
that both the bankruptcy rate and the risk premium on loans will be procyclical; this was also
the case in the original Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) model and for exactly the same reason.
In contrast, a risk shock produces countercyclical behavior in these three variables. Hence, this
argues for inclusion of risk shocks as an important impulse mechanism in the economy. With the
preference shocks, both the housing markup and risk premium react positively as expected: as
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Figure 4.6: Impulse of Housing Markup, Risk Premium on Loans, and Bankruptcy Rate to a 1%
increase in Uncertainty Shocks, Preference Shocks, Sector (Construction) Technology Shocks,
and Monetary Shocks: LTV = 0.1 (m=0.1).
Note: The vertical axis is measured as percentage deviation from steady-state values.
the demand increase, there is a greater incentive for the housing developers to a higher markup,
which then creates an upper pressure on the risk premium. The monetary shocks effect on the
housing markup is something that we cannot logically explain.
Finally, we report in Figures 4.8 and 4.9, the impulse response functions of the prices of land,
housing and the amount of borrowing to the four shocks. A technology shock to the construction
sector results in lower cost of housing inputs due to the increased output in residential investment
so that the price of housing falls. However, the price of land, i.e. the fixed factor, increases. For
an uncertainty (risk), preference and monetary shocks, the resulting fall in the supply of housing
causes the demand for the fixed factor (land) to fall and the price of the final good (housing)
to increase. In regards to the borrowing, we clearly see the role of monetary shock: 1% changes
in interest rate causes 0.2% decrease in the amount of borrowing. The monetary shock has the
biggest effect of all the shocks that are presented.
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Figure 4.7: Impulse of Housing Markup, Risk Premium on Loans, and Bankruptcy Rate to a 1%
increase in Uncertainty Shocks, Preference Shocks, Sector (Construction) Technology Shocks,
and Monetary Shocks: LTV = 0.85 (m=0.85).
Note: The vertical axis is measured as percentage deviation from steady-state values.
In ending this section, a word of caution is needed in interpreting the quantitative magnitudes
seen in the impulse response functions. In particular, note that the response of housing prices
to a preference shock increase is greater than the response due to, say, a risk shock or monetary
shock. One might deduce that the housing sector and risks and monetary shocks play a minor
role in the movement of housing prices. As the results from the full model (i.e. when the all
technology, monetary and risk shocks are present) imply, such a conclusion would be incorrect.
What drives housing and business cycles? Variance Decompositions
This section briefly describes the role of various shocks on some of the key macro and housing
variables. The main message from Table 4.3 is that the monetary and uncertainty shocks play
a major role in accounting for the movements in some of the aggregate as well as housing
variables. In other words, there is a large of policy makers in dealing with the volatilities of
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Figure 4.8: Impulse response of Land Price, Housing Price and Borrowing amount to a 1%
increase in Uncertainty Shocks, Preference Shocks, Sector (Construction) Technology Shocks,
and Monetary Shocks: LTV = 0.1 (m=0.1).
Note: The vertical axis is measured as percentage deviation from steady-state values.
these aforementioned variables. On the other hand, the preference shocks play almost no role
in any of the macro or housing variables.
Once again, Table 4.3 presents three different scenarios that are based on LTV ratio: low
(80), middle (85) and high (90) borrowing constraints. Unlike some of the recent literature that
emphasize the important role of the level of LTV on housing market, our results indicate other-
wise: almost no differences between different levels of LTV on the variables that we analyze. On
the role of specific shocks, Table 4.3 shows that the effects of monetary shocks are huge on most
of the macro variables and in particular on the housing investment and the amount of borrowing
the households undertake: over 75 % and almost 50 % of the variation in housing investment
and borrowing can be explained by the monetary shocks. On the contrary to monetary shocks,
housing demand shocks have a trivial impact on all the variables that we analyze: at most 6 % of
the variation in housing price can be explained by the preference shocks. Lastly, our endogenous
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Figure 4.9: Impulse response of Land Price, Housing Price and Borrowing amount to a 1%
increase in Uncertainty Shocks, Preference Shocks, Sector (Construction) Technology Shocks,
and Monetary Shocks: LTV = 0.85 (m=0.85).
Note: The vertical axis is measured as percentage deviation from steady-state values.
debt financial accelerator model with risk shocks lends a strong support for the important role
of risk shocks: over 85 % of the variation in housing price is due to risk shocks.
4.4 Some Final Remarks
Our primary findings fall into two broad categories. First, risk and monetary shocks to the
housing producing sector imply a quantitatively large role for uncertainty and monetary policy
over the housing and business cycles. Second, there is a great role for the government policies:
the effects of both monetary and risk shocks clearly show that having a stable economy can
indeed reduce the volatilities of various housing and macroeconomic variables.
For future research, modelling uncertainty due to time variation in the types of entrepreneurs
would be fruitful. One possibility would be an economy with a low risk agent whose productivity
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Table 4.3: Variance Decomposition of Forecast Error.
ub uσ uh uR
Shocks tech risk preference monetary
GDP 0.87 0.016 0.027 0.086
PCE 0.46 0.069 0.03 0.44
Capital Stock 0.54 0.007 0.01 0.44
House Stock Patient 0.55 0.022 0.044 0.38
House Stock Impatient 0.50 0.0039 0.029 0.465
Labor Hour (total) 0.49 0.062 0.049 0.40
Borrowing 0.495 0.0016 0.023 0.48
House Price 0.026 0.854 0.065 0.05
House Investment 0.148 0.085 0.037 0.735
shocks exhibit low variance and a high risk agent with a high variance of productivity shocks.
Because of restrictions on the types of financial contracts that can be offered, the equilibrium
is a pooling equilibrium so that the same type of financial contract is offered to both types of
agents. Hence the aggregate distribution for technology shocks hitting the entrepreneurial sector
is a mixture of the underlying distributions for each type of agent. Our conjecture is that this
form of uncertainty has important quantitative predictions and, hence, could be an important
impulse mechanism in the credit channel literature that, heretofore, has been overlooked. It also
anecdotally corresponds with explanations for the cause of the current credit crisis: a substantial
fraction of mortgage borrowers had higher risk characteristics than originally thought.
Moreover, our current model is silent about the optimal loan contract between the impatient
households and financial intermediaries. Developing an endogenous household loan model would
further shed light on the latest housing and financial boom and bust cycles. A quantitative
assessment of the relative importance of the role of monetary policy, as well as the analysis of
the optimal conduct of monetary policy, is also left to future research.
Nevertheless, from our analysis, there is a clear and important role for the policy makers
to smooth housing price and/or housing investment. The fact that both monetary and uncer-
tainty shocks play a prominent role in explaining the housing and macro business cycles, the
monetary policymakers have two instruments on hand to calm markets and provide market con-
fidence. However, one should be cautious in interpreting our empirical results as evidence for
policymakers to be directly involved in solving financial and housing problems.
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4.5 Appendix
4.5.1 Recent Developments in European Housing Markets: Some Facts
In this section, we briefly discuss some of the recent housing and macroeconomics development
for the aforementioned European countries. We start with the supply side by discussing the
residential investment, and then focus on the demand side factors: i) household debt for housing
loan, ii) borrowing factors; interest rate and loan-to-value.
Residential Investments
Figure 4.10: Annual residential investment from 1997 until 2011.
Source: OECD.
Figure 4.10 shows that residential investment moves in tandem to house prices to a various
degree across countries. Starting with nations that face fairly elastic housing supply, between
1997 and 2007, Spain, Ireland, and Greece’s residential investments approximately increased 120,
80 and 70 % respectively. For Italy and the average EU (15), increases in residential investment
have been more modest, despite large house price increases, suggesting that supply is fairly
inelastic in these countries. for Germany, residential investment has been stagnating or falling,
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but as in the housing price movement, the residential investment has been slightly increasing as
of 2009.
Household Debt
Figure 4.11: Household Debt: Long Term Loan for House Purchase.
Source: OECD.
Figure 4.11 shows the household’s long term loan for house purchase. There is a clear
correlation between the movements in house prices, residential investment and household debt
across the nations. With the rapid rising in house prices for some of the European nations and
with an easy access to credit24, Figure 4.3 illustrates some of the dramatic increase in the level of
household debt (measured by the long term loan for house purchase) over recent years. Except
for Germany, the household debt for the rest of the nations have been rapidly increasing over
the last few years. Greece leads the pack with being the most indebted amount, followed by
Ireland. An interesting aspect from figure 4 is that Ireland is the only nation that shows the
downturn on the amount of household debt. Italy and Portugal show that their household debts
24Recent product innovations including low and flexible mortgage rate products, which are essentially aimed at
restoring housing affordability in the face of rising prices, are well documented for the European countries (e.g.
ECB, 2009).
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are increasing whereby Spain and Greece are leveling off.25 High levels of household debt clearly
open up the vulnerability of households welfare to changes and shocks to mortgage payments,
personal disposable income, and especially to house prices.
Interest rates
Figure 4.12: Lending Rates (> 5 years) for House Purchases.
Source: ECB.
Figure 4.12 shows European mortgage interest rates (both real and nominal) have come down
considerably from early 1990 till mid 2005: the average nominal rate for the European nations
decreased from 12 to 4.5%. As can be seen in Figure 4.12 , except for Germany, the sample
country’s rates have been increasing from 2005 till their peak at late 2008. Subsequently, due
to various economic downturns in these countries, the rates have been again falling below the
2005 rates. Table 4.4 shows the loan types for various European and North America nations.
Loan-to-Value
25If one looks at the average household debt, of which mortgages are the main constituent, represented about
one year of household disposable income in 1995. By 2000, debt had risen to about 120% and in 2007 it was close
to 170% for the Euro zone countries (OECD, 2010).
76
Table 4.4: Interest rate type, loan term and lenders across countries.
Country Predominant Loan Term Main Lenders
Interest Rate (years)
Australia variable 25 Banks and nonbank specialist ”mortgage originators”
Austria fixed 25-30 Banks and Bausparkassen (mainly savings banks)
Belgium fixed 20 Banks
Canada mixed 25-35 Banks and specialized nondepository mortgage brokers
Denmark mixed 30 Mortgage and retails banks
France fixed 15-20 Mortgage and retails banks
Germany fixed 20-30 Banks and Bausparkassen (mainly savings banks)
Ireland variable 21-35 Banks, building societies and mortgage brokers
Italy mixed 20 Banks
Japan mixed 20-30 Banks and specialized mortgage institutions
Netherlands fixed 30 Banks and mortgage banks and brokers
Portugal variable 25-35 Banks
Spain variable 30 Banks (commercial and savings)
Sweden variable 30-45 Bank and mortgage institutions
U.K. variable 25 Banks, building societies and mortgage brokers
U.S. fixed 30 Banks and mortgage brokers
Source: The ”Housing and Finance in the Euro Area, March 2009” report, Table 3.2, European
Central Bank.
IMF (2011) reports that there has been a sharp increase in the loan-to-value ratios: during
the latest housing upturn, limits on the amount of mortgages have become less stringent than
in the past in many markets. Maximum loan-to-value ratios have generally exceeded 80% in
OECD countries. According to Table 3.2 in ECB (2009), Table 4.5 shows the maximum Loan
to Value ratios on new loans for Germany, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain are 80, 80, 100+,
90, and 100 respectively.
4.5.2 Complete set of equations of the model
The complete system of 62 equilibrium equations of the model is summarized below.
Household Sectors: 19 Equations ( patient and impatient households)
Patient households (8 equations) The household’s modified budget constraint (4.17)
ct+1+ik,t+1+ph,t+1ih,t+1 =
Kt (rt − τk (rt − δk)) +Ntwt (1− τn) + pl,txl,t + bt −Rb,t−1bt−1
1 + Πt+1
+aMms,t+1
Euler equations for the patient household (4.6) - (4.11), (4.24) - (4.29)
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Table 4.5: Loan to Value Ratios for selected countries.
Country LTV
Australia 90-100
Austria 80
Belgium 100
Canada 80
Denmark 80
France 100
Germany 80
Ireland 100+
Italy 80
Japan 70-80
Netherlands 125
Portugal 90
Spain 100
Sweden 80-95
UK 110
US 110+
Note: The column LTV refers to the maximum LTV on New Loans.Source: The ”Housing and
Finance in the Euro Area, March 2009” report, Table 3.2, European Central Bank.
wt
Rt
=
U3t
U1t
qk,t = βEt
((
(1− δk) qk,t+1 + (1− τk) rt+1 + τkδk
Rt+1
)
U1,t+1
U1,t
)
qh,t = βEt
(
(1− δh) qh,t+1U1,t+1
U1,t
+
U2,t+1
U1,t
)
1 = qk,tFk,1 (ik, t, ik, t−1) + βEt
(
qk,t+1Fk,2 (ik, t+1, ik, t)
U1,t+1
U1,t
)
ph, t = qh,tFh,1 (ih, t, ih, t−1) + βEt
(
qh,t+1Fh,2 (ih, t+1, ih, t)
U1,t+1
U1,t
)
1 = βRtEt
(
U1,t+1
(1 + Πt+1)U1,t
)
1 = βRb,tEt
(
Rt
Rt+1
U1,t+1
U1,t
)
Impatient Households (7 equations) The household’s modified budget constraint (4.20),
c′t+1 + ph,t+1i
′
h,t+1 =
N ′tw′t (1− τn) + b′t −Rb,t−1b′t−1
1 + Πt+1
+
M ′s,t+1
Pc,t+1
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collateral borrowing constraint (4.21),
b′t ≤ mEt
(
ph,t+1h
′
t
Rt
)
Euler equations:
w′t
R′t
=
U3t
U1t
1 = β′R′tEt
(
U1,t+1
(1 + Πt+1)U1,t
)
q′b,tR
′
t = 1− β′Rb,tEt
(
R′t
R′t+1
U1,t+1
U1,t
)
q′h,t = β
′Et
((
(1− δh) q′h,t+1 + q′b,t+1
b′t+1
h′t+1
)
U1,t+1
U1,t
+
U2,t+1
U1,t
)
ph, t = q
′
h,tFh,1
(
i′h, t, i
′
h,t−1
)
+ β′Et
(
q′h,t+1Fh,2
(
i′h, t+ 1, i
′
h,t
)U1,t+1
U1,t
)
Debt market clearing condition (4.22): 1 equation
b′t + bt = 0
Capital growth: 3 equations
ht+1 = Fh (ih, t, ih,t−1) + (1− δh)ht
h′t+1= Fh
(
i′h, t, i
′
h,t−1
)
+ (1− δh)h′t
Kt+1 = Fk (ik,t, ik,t−1) + (1− δk)Kt
Entrepreneur equations: 4 Equations
The entrepreneur equations include
1 = βηγEt
[
(rt+1 + 1− δκ) s¯t+1 f (ω¯t+1;σω,t+1)
1− s¯t+1g (ω¯t+1;σω,t+1)
]
st =
1
1− µΦ ($t) + µf ($t) ϕ($t)f ′($t)
pht
(
xζlty
1−ζ
dt
)
= ket
(rt + 1− δκ)
1− s¯tg (ω¯t;σω,t) s¯t
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ηket+1 = k
e
t (rt + 1− δκ)
s¯tf (ω¯t;σω,t)
1− s¯tg (ω¯t;σω,t) − c
e
t
Production side equations: 29 Equations for (i = b,m, s; j = c, d)
The production side equations are
xi =
∑
j=c,d
x1i,j
yj =
∏
i={b,m,s}
x1
ρi,j
i,j
pix1i,j = ρi,jpjyj
K =
∑
i=b,m,s
ki, N =
∑
i=b,m,s
ni
yh = x
φ
l y
1−φ
d
plxl = φphyh, pdyd = (1− φ)phyh
xi = k
θi
i
(
ezinai n
′1−a
i
)
1−θi
niw = apixi (1− θi)
n′iw
′ = (1− a)pixi (1− θi)
kir + n
′
iw
′ + niw = pixi
N ′ =
∑
i=b,m,s
n′i
Resource constraints: 2 equations
Gt + ct+c
′
t + c
e
t + ik,t = yc,t (4.89)
ih,t + i
′
h,t = yh,t (1− µΦ ($t)) (4.90)
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Goverment constraints: 2 equations
The real government spending Gt satisfies budget constraint equation and is assumed to be
proportional to the real GDP:
Gt + µΦ ($t) ph,tyh,t+
Mst +M
′
st
Pc,t
=
Kt (rt − δk) τk+
(
Ntwt +N
′
tw
′
t
)
τn+m
G
t
Gt = aG
(
yc,t + pd,tyd,t + qtht
)
(4.91)
where qt =
U2,t+1
U1,t
is the rental rate for housing (see Davis and Heathcote, 2005 for details).
The equations for external Shocks: 6 equations
The housing demand shock
lnµh,t+1 = (1− ρh) lnµ(0)h + ρh lnµh,t + εh,t+1
The money shock: Taylor Rule for interest rate Rt:
lnRt+1 = lnR0 + ρpi ln
(
1 + Πt
1 + Π0
)
+ ρgdp ln
(
GDPt
gkGDPt−1
)
+ εR,t+1
The intermediate goods production shocks (i = b,m, s):
zi =
∑
j=b,m,s
zjBi,j + εi,t+1
The volatility of entrepreneur’s production technology coefficient ωt:
σω,t+1 = σ
1−χ
0 σ
χ
ω,te
εσt+1
A competitive equilibrium is defined by the decision rules for (aggregate capital, entrepreneurs
capital, households (patient and impatien) labor, entrepreneur’s labor, entrepreneur’s net worth,
investment, the cutoff productivity level, household (patient and impatien) consumption, and en-
trepreneur’s consumption) given by the vector:
{
kt+1, k
e
t+1, Ht, H
e
t , Xt, ω¯t, ct, c
e
t , c
′
t, i
′
ht, N
′
t , w
′
t, b
′
t, h
′
t, n
′
bt, n
′
mt, n
′
st
}
where these decision rules are stationary functions of
{
Kt, Zt, ht, zi,t∈{b,m,s}σω,t, εM,t+1,εh,t+1
}
,
all markets clear and all the firms, households and entrepreneurs solve their respective maxi-
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mization problems, along with sets of equations representing the laws of motion for the sector
specific shocks (zt,i∈{b,m.s}), the monetary shock, the preference shock and the uncertainty shock.
In total, there are 62 variables:
c, ik, ph, ih,K, r,N,w, pl, b, Rb,ms,Π, c
′, i′h, N
′, w′, b′, h′, R, h, qk, qh, R′, q′b, q
′
h, s,$, σ, yh, Z, c
e,
xb, xm, xs, x1i,j(6), yc, yd, pb, pm, ps, pd, kb, km, ks, nb, nm, ns, n
′
b, n
′
m, n
′
s, zb, zm, zs, G, µh,m
G for
62 equations to be solved.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
This dissertation addresses the question, “how important are uncertainty shocks for the housing
market?”. My findings suggest a quantitatively substantial role of uncertainty for both the
housing market and the business cycle, especially in the context of financial frictions. Using a
model with asymmetric information, collateral constraints, and a Taylor Rule, uncertainty and
monetary shocks are found to play a quantitatively large role for the housing producing sector
over the housing- and business cycle. This result suggests a clear role for government policies:
reducing the variation in housing and macroeconomic variables by smoothing housing prices and
housing investment achieves a more stable economy.
For future research, combining this model with hump-shape uncertainty shocks could be
fruitful. My conjecture is that this approach to modeling uncertainty can capture not only the
bust but also the preceding run-up in housing- and real variables that was observed in the U.S.
and some European countries in the past decade. Therefore, uncertainty’s influence on real busi-
ness cycle variables might further increase, and remedy the countercyclical consumption implied
by jumping risk shocks. This conjecture is based on the results from chapter three, which exam-
ines the impact of hump-shaped uncertainty shocks on the economy. Unlike chapter four, there
are no collateral constraints but financial frictions which are worsened by hump-shaped uncer-
tainty shocks. These shocks result in a different propagation mechanism compared to previous
work combining uncertainty and financial accelerator models, as they induce precautionary sav-
ings; output then displays a hump-shaped with short expansions that are followed by longer and
persistent contractions. Besides, hump-shaped shocks remedy the counter-factual implication
of the DLS framework, that consumption is countercyclical. Moreover, hump-shape shocks that
correspond to empirical evidence quantitatively matter for the business cycle, accounting for 5%
of the variation in output and 11% and 18% of the variation in consumption and investment,
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respectively.
Jurado et al.’s (2015) and Ludvigson et al.’s (2016) empirical evidence, underlying the mod-
eling approach of chapter three, stresses the importance of removing the forecastable component
of the uncertainty proxy. Chapter two lends support to this point by presenting empirical ev-
idence regarding the difference between ex post and ex ante fluctuations of two uncertainty
proxies - profit growth and stock returns. Moreover, chapter two shows that fluctuations differ
across sectors and depend on whether financial or real variables are used to calculate uncer-
tainty. It is important to calibrate theoretical models accordingly, so as not to overstate the role
of uncertainty.
Overall, reconciling the disparate findings regarding the importance of uncertainty in both
financial accelerator and other types of models remains an important objective in the literature.
The results due to Lee, Salyer, and Strobel (2016) suggest a consensus is tightly linked to the
modeling approach and calibration, and thus exogenous. Therefore, an interesting extension
could be to endogenize uncertainty in financial accelerator models, such that uncertainty is
endogenously “accelerated”. This acceleration, in turn, might result from the interaction of
heterogeneous entrepreneurs and thus circumvent an exogenous specification.
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